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Roger Pearson
General Editor
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Motivations For Missile Defenses

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The use of offensive missiles in conflicts over the past 50 years has been examined to illustrate that ballistic missiles can no longer be regarded as unconventional weapons. Although they continue to be referred to as strategic systems, there is ample evidence to demonstrate their value as terror weapons, even when equipped with conventional high explosive warheads. These lessons seem to be learned more quickly by totalitarian regimes acquiring these offensive systems, than by democratic governments that remain reluctant to invest in active missile defenses. The issues involved have been reviewed and analyzed to ascertain whether there is truth in the supposition that allied populations are now exposed to unnecessary risks.

Key Words: BMD; Missiles as terror-weapons; Offensive use of Missiles; Military priorities, post-Cold War

Introduction

In an earlier publication analyzing the factors which contribute to decisions whether or not to invest in new defense programs, it was concluded that Defense Agencies would not take the missile threat seriously until the subject is discussed regularly at Cabinet level, or some rogue nation takes actions that forces the subject to be considered at that level[1]. In this article we review the ramifications of a number of well documented uses of missiles, or the threat of potential missile use, and the effects these have had on public opinion and the responses by the governments concerned. The examples include the V-1 & V-2 attacks against Britain in 1944[2], the extended use of missiles by Iran & Iraq during the so called War of the Cities in 1988[3], the use of Scud missiles by Saddam Husein against Israel and U.S. forces in Saudi during 1991[4], the Chinese attempt to influence the Taiwanese elections in 1996[5] and the threat of a second test launch of a North Korean long range ballistic missile in the August 1999 timeframe[6].

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These examples will be used to illustrate the fact that although many have argued that ballistic missiles are tools of geopolitical strategy, rather than militarily useful systems, they have already been used with varying degrees of success, and can hardly still be regarded as unconventional. As Ben Sheppard has pointed out, the use of ballistic missiles to terrorize a population, or paralyse the normal commercial life of an area, has now become a potent geopolitical tool[7].

World War II Use

The first major use of cruise missiles were the V-1 attacks, mainly on London in 1944. The British air defenses were initially unable to intercept them, and the weapons caused significant damage and casualties. Perhaps even more importantly, the V-1s and then the ballistic missiles, V-2s, which were used later in the year, adversely affected the morale of Londoners that had successfully survived the nightly aircraft attacks earlier in the war. The missile barrage led to one million Londoners (including one of the present authors) being evacuated from the city. Although modifying the air defenses and tactics enabled some success against the V-1s, nothing could be done to intercept the V-2s, and these continued as terror weapons until the launch sites in Europe were overrun by the advancing allied troops.

It was also reported by the Supreme Allied Commander, General Eisenhower, that attempts were made to disrupt the troop build up in British ports prior to the invasion of occupied France[8]. These failed partly because of the inaccuracy of the V-1s and -2s, and partly because they became available somewhat late in the game. There was some speculation that the effects on the invasion could have been far more severe had the Portsmouth & Southampton areas been the principle targets of these new weapons, rather than London. Their lack of accuracy however made them far more suitable for attacking a large metropolis, as opposed to the environs of a port.

An assessment of the first use of these cruise and ballistic missiles in warfare was that they proved to be real instruments of terror, producing disproportionate effects on the morale of the population, compared to the damage they were able to achieve.

The War of the Cities

Scott Ritter[3] has written about the development of the Al-

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Hussein missile and its use in the Iran/Iraq war. Following Iranian Scud attacks on Baghdad, efforts were stepped up in Iraq to modify a Scud-B to achieve a range of 600km which would enable it to reach Teheran. This led to the successful development of the Al-Hussein, first tested in a shorter range version in April 1987, and at the desired range by August. It went immediately into production and reached an output of 3 per day, such that by the end of February 1988 Iraq was able to launch 9 missiles against Teheran, and continue with daily attacks thereafter.

These attacks reinaugurated the War of the Cities which continued until April when a peace treaty was agreed. In those two months Iraq fired 189 missiles mostly against Teheran, while Iran was able to respond with fewer than 50 standard Scuds. Ritter suggests that the devastating impact of the BM attacks on Teheran played a major role in ending the war. Although they employed conventional high explosive warheads, the terror of the possible use of chemical warheads remained. There have been allegations that both sides used chemical weapons, but no hard evidence has been presented to support the claims[9]. What remains irrefutable is that the Iraqi air force had killed more people and destroyed more property than the Al-Hussein attacks, without inducing such a psychological effect on the population. This provides another example where the ramifications of the use of BMs proved to be far greater than their military effectiveness would indicate.

The Gulf War

Although the Al-Hussein missiles fired by Iraq against Saudi Arabia and Israel were the same as those used in the War of the Cities, this conflict attracted far more attention by the Western media, presumably because American and allied troops were in the firing line. Apart from the missile that struck the American barracks in Saudi Arabia, the loss of life resulting from these attacks was minimal, but the effect on the Israeli population was significant. Because of the fear that chemical warheads might be used, Israelis had been issued with gas masks and advised to stay in specially sealed rooms within their houses, at each warning of an air raid. It was somewhat ironic that Israeli life should be so disrupted by these Iraqi attacks, because Israel had been one of the few countries that appeared to have learned the lesson of the War of the Cities, and had

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embarked upon a ballistic missile defense program. In 1991, that program had not yet yielded any product, and morale suffered accordingly as it became clear that no defense was available. America rapidly transferred from Germany to Israel modified Patriot units, equipped with the earliest PAC-2 missiles, and although their effectiveness is still subject to disagreement, their presence gave increased confidence to the population and avoided the nightly evacuations of Tel Aviv. The fact that a defensive system was deployed also helped convince the Israeli Government not to attack Iraq, an action that would almost certainly have broken up the coalition that President Bush had worked so hard to build. The presence of the defense gained time for the exploration of alternative actions, that would not have been considered had the attacks continued to be unopposed.

This third major use of BMs in warfare appeared for a time to have made some real impact on America and many of its allies. The research program to develop the technologies for an American strategic defense, which had been in progress since 1983, was given a changed priority to concentrate on theater defenses, TMD. Repeated attempts were also made over the period 1991-94 to get NATO allies to join the modified program[10]. Britain did eventually invest a limited sum by undertaking yet another study of TMD, having previously conducted a multi year comprehensive European Architecture Study with American funding, This new activity, undertaken in industry was referred to as a Prefeasibility study, and was presented to the MOD in mid 1996. By the time MOD had assessed the study, a General Election was imminent and the results were quietly shelved. Japan too undertook a study following on from the U.S. funded Westpac; this too seemed to be leading nowhere until later North Korean activities (see below) forced Japan to take the subject more seriously. France, Germany and Italy joined America in the development of MEADS, a tactically mobile lower tier system, for defense against cruise and theater ballistic missiles. This is still an ongoing program, although France dropped out early on. The program has suffered from funding uncertainties, and is still not firmly established. Thus these initiatives which were started haltingly with allies after the 1991 war, and took 3 to 4 years to get fully underway, have either petered out or are still well short of completion 8 years later.

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China and Taiwan

In early March 1996 China launched four theater ballistic missiles into the sea close to Taiwan. Three landed 50 miles West of Kao Hsiung towards the southern end of the island and the fourth 48 miles East of Taipei on the northern end. At the time this was interpreted as a rather crude attempt to influence elections then due to be held on Taiwan. Although protesting about the firing of missiles into major shipping lanes a few miles off the island's two main ports, the only action taken by America was to divert the USS Bunker Hill to the area to monitor the shots[11]. It was later reported that former American Assistant Secretary of Defense, C.W. Freeman,was told by a Chinese official that Beijing could attack Taiwan without fear of U.S. intervention because American leaders care more about Los Angeles than they do about Taiwan[12]. This was interpreted as an indirect threat by China to use nuclear weapons against American West coast cities. Such comments also explain why China has so vociferously opposed current American plans to move forward once again with a national missile defense, NMD[13], since the deployment of a defense would reduce the effectiveness of such threats.

The Chinese/Taiwanese problem is not going to go away. There have been reports of a buildup of missile batteries on the Chinese coast opposite Taiwan[14]. The announcement in July 1999 by Taiwan's leader that the two should in future conduct talks on the basis of State-to State, rather than China to a breakaway province, has infuriated the Chinese and exacerbated the situation[15]. Under the Clinton Administration, American policy seems to have shifted away from an even handed approach, to one which avoids giving offence to Beijing, which is why the sale of defense equipment to Taiwan was delayed immediately following the State-to-State proposal[16]. There seems to be little doubt that China is embarked on a policy to expand its sphere of influence within Asia, a policy that in time will bring it into conflict with American allies like Japan and South Korea, in addition to Taiwan, all of which now look towards the U.S. as the ultimate deterrent against Chinese expansion.

North Korean Developments

In August 1998 North Korea tested a new missile called Taepo Dong, with a range in excess of 2000 km. The test made a telling

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point by overflying Japan while at the same time demonstrating that the Koreans had solved the problems of designing multistage missiles. The latter gave considerable support to an assessment of the Rumsfeld Commission made in a report to Congress presented only three weeks before the Korean test[17]. The Commission had been established because an earlier Intelligence assessment had indicated that no threat, outside of Russia and China, was likely to emerge to the continental U.S. for a further 10-15 years[18]. As a result of the 1998 test, and a further one reported to be imminent in August 1999, there is now speculation that North Korea could soon possess missiles capable of striking American soil[19]. Negotiations between America and North Korea during August and September 1999, are reported to have led to an agreement by the Korean's not to have another test launch of this longer range Taepo Dong missile in exchange for a broader degree of normalization of relations between the two countries[20]. At the time of writing the precise nature of the agreement has not been made clear, but to some it seems that in an effort to reach an accommodation with the communist regime, the American Administration are succumbing to a form of blackmail.

These activities appear to have convinced the Japanese government that it could no longer ignore the potential missile threat, and an announcement was made in August 1999 that an agreement had been signed with the U.S. to undertake joint research on a TMD system[21]. The total cost of the research effort was reported to be in the range of $400M to $524M, which would be split equally between the two countries, over a period of 5 to 6 years. Despite the publicity given to the agreement to undertake a joint program, the level of investment allocated, and the timescale over which it will be spent, suggests that this effort is more in the category of window dressing rather than a serious attempt to move towards a deployed TMD system. Japanese officials have acknowledged that the agreement with America is related to the situation in North Korea, but emphasize that it is a research effort and that any possible deployment is years, if not decades, away. Until this announcement Japan had resisted overtures made over several years from the U.S. to participate in TMD research. The belief is that Japan resisted so as not to offend China and Russia, both of which object strongly to American missile defense activities. The Chinese Ambassador to the U.S., Li Zhaoxing, was condemning the joint missile defense program, within days of the

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agreement's announcement, suggesting Japan should pursue peace rather than missile defense[22]. It seems clear that the overt actions of North Korea appear to have convinced Japan to climb finally off a fence, that they have been prepared to sit upon for a long time.

The concern over North Korean missile developments is exacerbated by the fact that there is evidence that they have been willing to transfer hardware and capabilities to anyone willing to pay hard currency. There are now multiple pathways to proliferation through several nations, such as North Korea, Iran, Iraq and others, leading to a self-sustaining progression, no longer dependent on the original proliferators such as China and Russia[17]. The net result of these collaborations is a much more rapid rate of transfer of advances in weaponry than would be possible if each nation had to rely on indigenous capabilities.

One Further Incident

In addition to the major events summarized above, there was an attempt by Libya in 1986 to attack the southern Italian city of Lampedusa as a reprisal for allowing American planes to use Italian airfields for an earlier reprisal raid on Libya[23]. The Scud missiles fell into the sea, short of the target. This led to an initial Italian interest in missile defense, and the start of negotiations to purchase Patriot systems. These were never delivered, but the incident may have been responsible for the later Italian involvement in the MEADS program.

Discussion

The above review of missile use and threats over the past 50 years reveals some interesting, and perhaps even surprising data. Although missiles still seem to be regarded as unconventional weapons, possibly because none were fired during the prolonged stand-off between America and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Nonetheless, as we have seen they have been used aggressively by non-democratic states, and the proliferation of such systems to more than 20 countries cannot be reassuring[17], particularly when such vociferous criticisms are raised against the development of defensive designs. Since defensive systems are inherently non aggressive, it has been suggested by opponents of missile defense that countries which already possess nuclear deterrent systems, could use missile defenses as protection against the limited reprisal attacks that an opponent

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could muster after being subjected to a nuclear assault. It is thus inferred that missile defenses are destablising, because they provide an opportunity for their possessor to undertake a first strike option with impunity. This totally unrealistic scenario has been conceived despite the fact that no defense will ever be totally leakproof, and therefore no democratically elected government would ever be free to engage in such a cavalier activity.

Despite their lack of perfection, defenses can serve several important purposes; their possession acts as a deterrent to the acquisition of offensive systems by others, they also provide a level of protection should diplomatic and other means fail to prevent hostilities and equally as important they give governments time to consider alternative reactions once hostilities start. The deterrent aspect comes from the recognition, even by zealots, that there is far less benefit from investment in offensive systems for which a counter already exists. While the defensive systems currently under development may not operate perfectly, an attacker with a limited arsenal would be far less confident of achieving objectives because the defense would significantly reduce damage and casualties. The experience of the use of Patriot PAC 2 in Israel provided a clear example of the value of deploying even an imperfect system. These conclusions appear to be so obvious that it is necessary to delve deeper to ascertain why most allied governments are still so reluctant to act upon them.

There has been a tendency to regard ballistic missiles armed only with conventional warheads, as indulgences of petty dictators, because of the limited damage they can cause. However reflection of the effects of the use of these weapons in World War II, the War of the Cities, and the Gulf War indicates that they have been very effective in undermining the morale of civilian populations, and perhaps should not be dismissed too lightly.

The initial V1 attacks on Britain were accompanied by the usual air raid warnings, because the cruise missiles could be detected as easily as aircraft. Civilian populations were therefore warned in advance of the V1 approach and were able to take refuge in shelters; life was disrupted, but not too badly. The advent of the V2s however took things to a new level. Their launch and flight could not be detected in time to give any prior warning, and in addition the public quickly became aware that there was no way of intercepting them.

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Here was a weapon that caused significant damage and casualties, and nothing could stop it. It was fortunate that the V2s did not become operational earlier, or the successful invasion of the channel coasts of Europe which led to the capture of the launch sites, might have been too late to stop a severe loss of public confidence, and even possibly the will to continue the fight. As it turned out the retreat of the German forces soon put London beyond the range of the missiles, and the attacks ceased.

The use of Scud missiles in the War of the cities was similar to the earlier V2 attacks on London, with the added dimension that rumors persisted that chemical warheads were either being used, or might be in the future. This fear naturally added to the Iranian public concern, and the missile attacks have been credited with bringing the war to an end.

The Iraqi attacks against Israel took this chemical warhead concern yet a stage further. Because Israeli intelligence was aware that Iraq had weaponised their chemical capability, they had no alternative but to issue gas masks, and to advise on procedures to seal one or more rooms in each house to protect against such attacks. The attacks were no longer of the surprise variety, because American space based sensors were able to detect the launch of Iraqi missiles and relay this information to their allies. However the tracking capability of these sensors was inadequate to distinguish between missiles launched to Saudi Arabia and those to Israel, so that both centers received warnings for each launch. This resulted in Israeli citizens being subjected to considerable disruption of normal life. Friends who had to sit for hours in their sealed rooms, now assure us that after such experiences they have no doubt whatsoever of the terror induced by such attacks, nor of the value they now place on missile defenses. It is certainly not a coincidence that Israel will be the first nation to deploy a non-nuclear strategic missile defense when their system based on the Arrow interceptor enters service in 2000.

Rumors have persisted that during the Desert Storm conflict Iraq received warnings not to use chemical or biological warheads, and thereby avoid escalation to the use of even more potent U.S. systems in reprisal. These suggestions have been associated with the concept that even leaders such as Saddam Husein can be deterred from using warheads of mass destruction. There is however no evidence that such warnings were ever issued, nor can there be an assurance that had

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Iraq used these weapons, a U.S. nuclear response in kind would have followed. Nuclear deterrence has been, and remains, a game of brinkmanship, and is one of the reasons that President Reagan sought another solution to the problem.

The experiences of those populations that have been subject to missile attacks fully support the hypothesis proposed by Ben Sheppard, that missiles, armed even only with conventional warheads, have been potent geopolitical tools for a long time[7]. The more recent proliferation of chemical, biological and radiological warheads, as reviewed in a seminar at King's College London in 1996[24], merely adds to the concern. It is clear that the ability to terrorize populations, or to hold them to ransom, is now viewed as a considerable asset by some regimes. It seems to be equally obvious that the absence of defenses against such systems will do nothing to discourage their further proliferation. Nor of course will this absence of defenses assist those attacked, if the threat to use offensive missiles materializes. Those targeted will remain unprotected, not because defenses are unachievable, but because of policy decisions not to deploy them.

The warning missiles fired against Taiwan in 1996, caused their government to express a much keener interest in BMD. There are reports that since then Taiwan has made representations to America either to purchase systems, or to undertake joint developments. These have not been welcomed by the American administration, presumably because of its wish to retain better relationships with China[25]. In a September 1999 interview the Taiwanese Minister of National Defense revealed that requests had been made to the U.S. for Patriot Pac-3, Aegis, and an advanced early warning radar; responses were still awaited[26]. Whether the agreement to cooperate with Japan on TMD will modify the American position taken with regard to Taiwan is too early to decide, but the two represent different scenarios because of China's insistence that Taiwan is merely a breakaway province of theirs.

It is really the policy decisions of those countries that have not been the target of an attack in recent years that remain the enigma. While it is clear that cost, international treaties, and technology availability all contribute towards avoidance of investment, none of these, singly nor conjoined, seem to be sufficient to justify the neglect still accorded to the growing menace of missile threats. The answer

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seems to lie in the actuality of the threat itself.

America, as the sole remaining Superpower, has accepted that its troops will be called upon on a regular basis to restore order in crisis areas around the world. Since missiles may well be utilized in these operations, America has a firm policy to deploy a TMD. On the other hand, with the exception of the Soviet/Russian and Chinese nuclear threats, assumed nullified by America's deterrent missiles, no real threat to continental America has materialized since the Cuban crisis of 1961. That was close to 40 years ago and did not lead to any attack. Even though the topic of missile defense continues to be a subject of active debate within the American media, this has not generated any strong consensus for an NMD. This separation of strategic and theater/tactical threats is a concept exclusive to America. Geography has enabled the U.S. to participate in two World Wars without being in danger of direct attack. None of its allies have this luxury, with Britain being the only major one which has not had fighting on its own soil this century, but was of course subjected to prolonged bombing and missile attacks. Thus to most of America's allies threats are threats, without separation into strategic and tactical, which of course makes it all the more surprising that missile defense is not taken more seriously by them.

It is clear that Israel can be under no such illusions. Since the State's foundation in 1948 it has survived in a hostile environment, constantly under threat of annihilation. Once within range of offensive missiles, Israel had to take action to defend itself. The Gulf War proved beyond any lingering doubt that any other policy could prove to be suicidal.

Even though Britain too was subjected to missile attacks, they occurred 55 years ago, and most of those with clear memories of the attacks are no longer in a position to influence policy. As with the American/Cuban crisis, the corporate memory of the fear and panic of the time has faded. The events occurred in history and seem to most of the population to have no more relevance today than accounts of the horrors committed in Europe and the Middle East during the Crusades.

It is in this light that the decision of Japan to edge towards a missile defense program has to be viewed. North Korea has fired a multistage missile over their country once, and is threatening to do so again. These are events that any government would find hard to

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ignore. Their post World War II constitution, restricts their military options, but does not prevent the deployment of defenses, hence their first tentative moves down this path[27]. Taiwan too has faced recent missile intimidation and clearly would like to take action to guard against real attacks. So far they are being frustrated in their efforts to secure American support for the acquisition of missile defenses because of linkages to the broader political relationships between China and America.

The conclusions seem to suggest that only a real attack, or the emergence of an unmistakable capability by a potential adversary will force others down a similar path. Until then the European allies of America seem to be content to rely on somewhat vague promises of protection from missile attack by American resources. This relic of Cold War mentality rests partly on the concept of extended deterrence, which has never been rescinded, and partly on the expectation that American active defense capabilities will be made available in times of crises. The proliferation of offensive systems has raised questions about the credibility of an American nuclear response to the attack on one of its NATO allies, and if rogue nations are not convinced of such retaliation, this inevitably undermines the whole concept of deterrence. On the other hand an active defense that could provide effective protection to populations is unlikely to become available before 2007 at the earliest, and even then may not be procured in sufficient quantities to satisfy American and allied requirements[28].

In March 1996 Lady Thatcher gave an address at Westminster College in Fulton MO, 50 years after Winston Churchill's historic Iron Curtain speech at the same location[29]. Acknowledging that she might be accused of spreading alarm by concentrating on the growing missile threat, Lady Thatcher reminded the audience that Churchill was accused of warmongering when he stated that "From Stattin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an iron curtain has descended across the continent". In the same way that critics turned upon Churchill, as though he not Stalin had drawn down the iron curtain, those opposing missile defenses have criticized President Reagan for his vision, and continue to criticize those who support it. Lady Thatcher made it clear that her greatest fear was the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, which on present trends would shortly have all the capitals of Europe within target range, and be a direct

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threat to American shores early in the next century. She pointed out that there is no mysterious means to disarm a state which is not willing to be disarmed, adding that as Frederick the Great had observed, "Diplomacy without arms is like music without instruments."

President Reagan and Lady Thatcher understood world power and politics. They both believed passionately in working towards peaceful, diplomatically achieved agreements by negotiating from positions of strength. As students of history they understood all too well that dictators have never been satisfied by appeasement, but only respect counterstrength, which prevents aggressors from achieving their aims. That is why Lady Thatcher cautioned against a future trans-Atlantic rift arising from strained relations between America and Europe. She foresaw this danger from a succession of trade disputes, while others now see such an outcome arising from the recent NATO involvement in Kosovo, exacerbated by the neglect of BMD by European nations[30].

As things stand it seems that too few in power either recognize the risks of missile attacks, or are prepared to take the necessary action to prevent them materializing. For example, in late September it was reported that NATO allies are expected to agree to launch a four year feasibility study for a TMD system in November 1999, the work which would be undertaken in industry, would not start until Spring 2000[31]. Officials releasing the information pointed out that the study was expected to lead to the identification of technical requirements for a TMD and possibly a development program, but not necessarily procurement. Other officials noted that European nations have other higher priorities to address; such as acquisition of precision guided munitions and airborne ground surveillance systems, without explaining how such priorities had been decided. It seems clear that the European attitude is little different to that of the Japanese, which was described earlier as a form of window dressing. If Governments were genuinely concerned with the growing danger of missile proliferation, there would be no need for yet a further 4 year review of such a well studied topic as TMD, before deciding whether or not to proceed with development.

The newly appointed British, Tory shadow defense secretary, Iain Duncan Smith made this point in his first major speech[32]. He attributed the lack of enthusiasm for missile defense to the overriding

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desire of Europeans to have a defense policy independent of the US. If he is correct, it seems clear that no amount of warning will be effective, until we experience an attack on a major city. A rather drastic way to drive home the real risk with no BMD in Europe to prevent the first tragedy. Such an event will no doubt be hastily followed by a crash program to acquire a defense, that should have been in place to prevent the loss of life. It is ironic that the perpetrator of that attack would then have the title of "Father of European BMD" bestowed upon him.

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THE ABM TREATY CHARADE:
A Study in Elite Illusion and Delusion

William T. Lee

Former CIA and DIA analyst of Soviet and U.S. missile programs

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Oil Security at the Dawn of the New Millennium

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Indiana University of Pennsylvania, Indiana, PA

For several decades the interests of oil producers and oil consumers were seen as mutually exclusive. The gains of one side would be achieved at the expense of the other side. This study argues that at the turn of the century, oil security should not be seen as a zero-sum game. Instead both producers and consumers need to work together to ensure stability of oil market. The paper examines some of the forces that shape this proposed cooperation. They include technological advances, foreign investment, economic crisis and projected recovery in Asia, and the potential impact of the Kyoto Protocol. Finally, the American role in ensuring stability in the global oil market is analyzed.

Key Words: Middle East, Persian Gulf, Oil, Iran, Iraq, Kyoto Protocol

For the last several decades oil has been the single most important primary energy source and is projected to maintain this status in the foreseeable future. In addition, oil is the largest internationally traded good, both in volume and value terms – creating what some analysts call a "hydrocarbon economy[1]" In short, it can be stated that world economy runs on oil and there is no substitute in sight. Since its discovery in the middle of the nineteenth century, however, oil has been a highly volatile blend of politics and economics.[2]

In the period up to the early 1970s the international oil companies, particularly the so-called "seven sisters[3]", dominated the market and set the prices at an extremely low level in order to maximize their profit. In response, several producing countries

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[1] Energy Information Administration, Department of Energy, "OPEC Revenues Fact Sheet," September 1998, (on line.)

[2] Behrooz Fattahi and Omid Fattahi, "The Political Economy of Oil: United States and Middle East Post-World War II Relations," International Journal of Energy, Vol.5, No.3/4, December 1997, p.214.

[3] These are: Standard Oil Company of New Jersey (Exxon), Royal Dutch Shell, British Petroleum, Mobil Oil Corp, Standard Oil Company of California (Chevron), Texaco Inc, and Gulf Oil Corp.

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created the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries[4] (OPEC) and took control of their resources and raised prices several folds. These skyrocketed prices, along with political instability, resulted in declining demand, due to energy conservation, and increasing supply from non-OPEC sources. Thus, the share of these states in world oil production rose from 44% in 1973 to a peak of 71% in 1985.[5] This declining demand in conjunction with over-supply contributed to the price crash of 1985-86.

Since then, there have been several changes which are likely to have a long-term impact on the evolution of the international oil market. First, there has been a tremendous advance in the technology. Increasingly it is cheaper to discover and produce oil. A new barrel of oil reserves that cost about $15 to find in 1977 (inflation-adjusted price), costs less than $5 to find in 1999.[6] These irreversible technological advances have increased the relative attractiveness of non-OPEC producers (particularly the North Sea). Second, the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 opened the door for the international oil companies to explore the energy resources in these former Soviet republics which had been closed to foreign investment for most of the twentieth century. Third, several oil producing states have decided to privatize their energy sector and relax the government's control. Similarly, national oil companies are increasingly directed by more commercial standards and less political ones. These interrelated changes have drastically altered the characteristics of the international oil market at the turn of the century. Currently, there is abundant amount of oil and there are plentiful players.

Within this new market environment the price crash of 1997-98 took place. In real terms, oil prices had touched levels not seen since the early 1970s. The main reason was that the market was saturated - too many barrels were chasing too few customers. Under these

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[4] The members are: Algeria, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Venezuela. As of December 31, 1992, Ecuador withdrew its membership in OPEC, and as of December 31, 1994, Gabon withdrew its membership.

[5] Bob Williams, "Oil Producers Face Key Question: How Long Will Prices Stay Low?" Oil and Gas Journal, Vol.96, No.52, December 28, 1998, p.20.

[6] Energy Information Administration, Department of Energy, 25th Anniversary of the 1973 Oil Embargo, December 1998, (on line.)

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circumstances both oil exporters and importers were suffering. It is estimated that Saudi Arabia, the world's largest exporter, loses around $2.5 billion for every $1 per barrel drop in the price of oil.[7] On the other side, in the United States, the world's largest importer, 29,300 jobs were lost in petroleum industry in 1998.[8] The kingdom's decisions to reduce its production and the merger of Exxon, the largest US oil company, with Mobil, the second largest oil company, in order to reduce expenses demonstrate the mutual interests between producers and consumers to stabilize prices. Thus, it can be stated that the 1998 price crash raised questions regarding the meaning and objective of "oil security".

For a long time the interests of oil producers and consumers were considered mutually exclusive and were pursued in a zero-sum competition. Each side was interested in maximizing its profit at the expense of the other side. Under these conditions, oil security was seen as avoiding a sudden interruption of oil supplies and achieving a state of "energy independence". The volatility of oil prices, however, proved harming for both sides. At the turn of the century there is a growing consensus between consumers and producers on a common strategy to stabilize prices. Thus, Ahmad Zaki Yamani, Chairman of the london-based Center for Global Energy Studies and former Saudi Arabian Minister of Petroleum and Mineral Resources, is advocating a "system of interlocking economic interests.[9]" Similarly, Ali alNaimi, the current Saudi Minister of Petroleum and Mineral Resources, stated that "energy security is a shared issue for producers and consumers.[10]"

In short, the contention of this essay is that at the dawn of the new millennium oil security should not be seen as a confrontation

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[7] Energy Information Administration, Department of Energy, Country Profile: Saudi Arabia, January 1999, (on line.)

[8] Oil and Gas Journal, "US Crude Oil Prices Lowest since 1930s depression," Vol.97, No.3, January 18, 1999, p.24.

[9] Ahmad Zaki Yamani, "Perspective and Retrospective: Oil Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow," Middle East Economic Survey, Vol.41, No.49, December 7, 1998, (on line.)

[10] Ali al-Naimi, "Future World Oil Outlook," Middle East Economic Survey, Vol.41, No.44, November 2, 1998, (on line.)

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between producers and consumers. Rather, the main focus should be to promote cooperation between the two sides. Economic dynamics, not political considerations, should shape oil market and determine prices. In the following sections, assessments of some factors which are likely to influence oil supply and demand are provided. On the supply side the focus will be on the slow and hesitant process of privatizing oil industry in Iran and the Gulf monarchies, the potential return of Iraqi oil to the international market, and the eventual blossoming of supplies from the Caspian Basin. On the demand side, the projected environmental impact of Kyoto Protocol and the fast-growing Chinese oil import will be examined. Finally, the paper addresses the American role in ensuring stability to the international oil market.

I. The Supply Side

At the dawn of the new millennium oil industry is less concentrated than it was few decades ago, simply stated several regions have substantially increased their share of world oil production. These include north America, the North Sea[11], Mexico, and Latin America.[12] The expansion of production from these regions came at the expense of the Persian Gulf producers. This can be seen as a reverse of simple economic logic. More money and efforts have been invested in developing high-cost reserves than low-cost ones. At least two factors can explain this structural change in the oil industry. On one side, the insistence of Gulf producers to maintain high prices for most of the 1970s and the early 1980s had forced oil companies to explore other options. On the other side, political instability and the wave of nationalizing oil industry in the Gulf provided oil companies with incentives to develop other reservoirs. In addition, some of these non-Gulf producers, especially in the North Sea, have provided attractive fiscal terms, trustworthy legal regimes, and access to appropriate technologies.

Subsea drilling technology has permitted economical access to

[11] The North Sea's resources are concentrated mainly in two countries: Norway and the United Kingdom.

[12] Mexico and Venezuela account for most of Latin America's reserves and production. New discoveries in Colombia appear promising.

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resource-rich, deepwater areas that were considered too harsh or environmentally risky for development. Particularly important is three dimensional seismic (3D), which requires the use of fast computing and improved graphic techniques, and four dimensional (4D), which identifies drainage patterns over time and locates by-passed oil.[13] The technique makes it possible to calculate the depth and configuration of the buried structures.[14] In parallel with seismic survey, there have been great advances in well-logging so as to determine accurately where the oil zones lie. Still, it is important to point out that eventhough technology can extend the peak and delay or slow the decline of production, eventually production falls, given a fixed oil resource. This is exactly what is projected to happen in the North Sea. The reservoir, the largest province found since the Second World War, relies heavily on high technology for extraction. However, most analysts expect output from the North Sea to peak in the first decade of the new millennium.[15] Thus, one can conclude that despite the impressive technological advances the bulk of incremental world oil demand will be met by those countries with the largest reserves - the Persian Gulf producers.

Given the fact that the Gulf region holds approximately 65 percent[16] of world proven oil reserves[17], there is no doubt that its share in global production will expand. The United States Department of Energy, for example, projects that Persian Gulf production as a percentage of world consumption will jump from 26.3 percent in 2000 to 36.4 percent in 2020.[18] This optimistic projection, however, should not be taken for granted. The Gulf producers' attitude toward private investment is a decisive factor in their attempt to increase production.

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[13] Anthony J. Finizza, "The Future of Oil," Business Economics, Vol.31, No.2, October 1996, p.10.

[14] C.J. Campbell, The Coming Oil Crisis, Essex, England: Multi-Science Publishing Company, 1997, p.173.

[15] See for example Energy Information Administration, International Energy Outlook, Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1999, p.28.

[16] British Petroleum, BP Statistical Review Of World Energy, London, 1998, p.4.

[17] Proven means that there is considerable geologic and engineering evidence that supports the ability to develop such resources under current economic and technological environments.

[18] Energy Information Administration, International Energy Outlook, Washington DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1999, p.206.

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can be explained by economic and strategic interests. Oil producers increasingly need the international companies' advanced technology, managerial expertise and financial resources. In addition, Gulf states realize that a dollar invested in developing their output is dollar not spent elsewhere. Thus, by inviting foreign investment they would increase their share of world production at the expense of other producers. Finally, the presence of foreign companies would strengthen the economic ties between Western countries and the Gulf states and deepen the interests of the former to ensure the security of the latter. On the other side, international oil companies would love to have access to the low-cost, high-volume, and almost exploration risk-free Gulf oil. Accordingly, several formulas have been proposed to encourage the return of international companies to the oil sector in the Gulf.[19] These include joint ventures[20] and buy-back agreements.

These buy-back contracts have been the favorite method for Iran to lure international oil companies to invest in its huge oil sector. It is worth remembering that the Iranian constitution specifically rules out the granting of petroleum rights on a concessionary basis. The buy-back arrangement sees the foreign company as neither partner nor concessionaire. Instead private company acts as a hired contractor servicing the national company by providing all investment capital for exploration and is paid in kind after the production of first commercial oil.[21] In other words, the buy-back formula permits Iran to get around constitutional opposition to the entry of foreign firms into its energy projects. Also, it is worth mentioning that in spite of the American sanctions Tehran has succeeded in signing several agreements with international companies to develop its energy infrastructure. The list includes Total and EIF Aquitaine of France, ENI of

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[19] For an analysis of these formulas see Naji Abi-Aad, "The Legal framework of expanding oil production capacity in the Gulf," International Journal of Global Energy Issues, Vol.10, No.1, January 1998, pp.46-51.

[20] Joint ventures are arrangements under which a state enterprise and a private (usually foreign) venturer invest stated amount of capital which can take various forms, including money, intellectual property, or physical assets and rights to land. The partners share the risk and reward of the venture in proportion to the capital contributed. See International Energy Agency, Caspian Oil And Gas, Paris, 1998, p.122.

[21] Derek Brower, "Iranian buy-back contracts: Guaranteed return is popular," Petroleum Economist, Vol.66, No.3, March 99, p.24.

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Italy, Gazprom of Russia, Petronas of Malaysia, Bow Valley of Canada, and Lasomo of Britain among others. Given the fact that Iran holds the world's fifth largest oil reserves there is no doubt that these projects will be profitable for both the Islamic Republic and the international companies.

Still these international companies are most interested in the country with the world's largest oil reserves – Saudi Arabia. Thus, the kingdom is considered the richest prize in the oil industry. Saudi Arabia nationalized its oil fields in the 1970s and put them under the government entity ARAMCO. For more than two decades foreign companies have been restricted to the "downstream" end of the business – refining and shipping – and were kept our of the "upstream" one – drilling and exploration. However, in his visit to the United States in late 1998, Crown Prince Abdullah invited senior representatives from a number of leading American oil companies for a discussion on future cooperation between the two sides.[22] During this meeting the Crown Prince told the American executives that the Saudi government wants them involved again in a new strategic energy partnership.[23] However, in spite of these promising signals, it is unlikely that international oil companies will be allowed back into the Saudi upstream oil sector any time soon at least for three reasons. First, the kingdom does not need to expand its capacity to produce oil since it can't sell all the oil it is able to produce now.[24] Second, unlike other state oil companies, ARAMCO is among the most technologically competent in the world and has no problem borrowing any additional funds for new projects. Bluntly, the kingdom is not in a dire need for foreign technology and capital. Third, the American military presence in the kingdom has already antagonized a segment of the Saudi political/religious establishment. Opening the door for American oil companies will tremendously sharpen domestic criticism. Thus, international oil companies are not likely to be

[22] These companies are: Exxon, Chevron, Texaco, Mobil, Conoco, Arco, Occidental, Amoco and Phillips.

[23] David B. Ottaway and Martha M. Hamilton, "Saudis Talk With Seven US Oil Firms," Washington Post, September 30, 1998, p.A1.

[24] Oil and Gas Journal, "Editorial: Richardson's good month," Vol.97, No.8, February 22, 1999, p.17.

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involved in the Saudi upstream sector in the near future.[25] This conclusion does not apply to the next-door neighbor - Iraq.

For most of the 1990s, Iraq has represented the most troubling question regarding any attempt to project, accurately, world oil supplies. Simply stated, there is a great deal of uncertainty regarding the time and manner of Baghdad's resuming its role as a major oil producer. Thus, some industry analysts describe Iraq as a dormant giant.[26] According to the United States Department of Energy Iraq contains 112 billion barrels of proven oil reserves, along with roughly 215 billion barrels of probable and possible resources.[27] The British Petroleum supports this assessment and states that Baghdad holds the world's second largest oil reserves, exceeded only by Saudi Arabia.[28] Furthermore, it is believed that if advanced technology were used instead of primary exploration methods, the figures will go much higher. Thus, given the country's tremendous energy resources, it is not an exaggeration to call it a giant. However, these resources have not been fully utilized due to political constraints. Over the last two decades Iraq went to two costly wars and has been under strict international economic sanctions since its invasion of Kuwait in August 1990. Under these circumstances few resources were available to develop the country's energy infrastructure. In short, at the beginning of the new millennium Iraq's oil resources are heavily under-explored and heavily under-developed.[29]

Before the Gulf War, Iraq had plans to increase its output from 3 million barrels per day (b/d) to 6 million b/d within a five year period.[30] This target still stands, but obviously can not be pursued as long as the sanctions are in place. Regardless of when these sanctions will be lifted, there is no doubt that at one point Iraq will

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[25] For a thorough analysis of the prospects of international companies returning to the Saudi upstream sector see Nathaniel Kern "Oil Prices and Foreign Investment in Saudi Arabia," Middle East Economic Survey, Vol.42, No.14, April 5, 1999 (on line).

[26] Fadhil J. Chalabi, "Global Energy Demand and Middle East Supply," Middle East Insight, Vol.13, No.6, November-December 1998, p.25.

[27] Energy Information Administration, Country Analysis: Iraq, Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, November 1998, p.5.

[28] British Petroleum, BP Statistical Review of World Energy, London, 1998, p.4.

[29] Bob Williams, "Oil Producers Face Key Question: How Long Will Prices Stay Low?" Oil and Gas Journal, Vol.96, No.52, December 28, 1998, p.22.

[30] Energy Economist, "A Shift Worth Watching," No.160, October 1997, p.6.

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have to be rehabilitated and reintegrated in the international energy system. In preparation for such development, the government in Baghdad has already signed several agreements with international oil companies from Russia, China, Italy, France and others. A post-sanctions Iraq will desperately need foreign capital and technology. Meanwhile, the companies would love to invest in Iraq's low-cost and abundant oil resources. This "marriage of convenience", when it happens, will have strong impact on prices, supply, and investment. More Iraqi oil, without adequate accommodation by other suppliers, would lead to low prices.[31] In addition, the opening of the Iraqi sector to international companies will lure foreign investment away from the Caspian Basin with its high-cost and geo-political problems. A recent study published by the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies (OIES) concludes that "accelerated Iraqi development would make the Caspian rapidly appear to be a backwater of the international energy industry.[32]

The collapse of the Soviet Union gave the international oil companies access to energy resources in the Caspian Basin. Shortly after independence Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan opened their acreage to foreign investment. Geologically, the region looks very promising in terms of oil and natural gas reserves but substantial obstacles need to be overcome for these resources to be fully developed. Particularly important are an accurate assessment of how much reserves are there, the legal status of the Basin, and the choice of the most appropriate transportation routes from the region to the international market. The manner in which these issues are resolved, whether adversarial or cooperative, will determine how quickly oil from the Caspian Basin penetrates world market.

Since the early 1990s, there has been an euphoria concerning the potential energy resources in the Caspian. There is no agreement on precisely how much reserves the region holds. Originally, the Caspian Basin was presented as a potential "back-up" of the Persian Gulf. However, current estimates provide less optimistic expectations.

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[31] It is worth remembering that the recent partial return of Iraqi oil to the international market in line with the United Nations Security Council's resolutions had participated, with other factors, in the collapse of oil prices in 1997-98.

[32] Paul horsnell, "Caspian Oil and Gas: A Game, if not a Great Game," OIES Monthly Comment, January 1999, (on line).

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A recent study by the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies concludes that Caspian energy is much less important than many political analyses have implied. Specifically, the study states, "The North Sea rather than Saudi Arabia is a better point of comparison.[33]" Similarly, the James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy concludes that "the Caspian Basin is not going to be the 'ace in the hole' for international energy security.[34]"

In addition to this lack of consensus on how much oil and gas are in the Caspian Basin, there is no agreement on the legal status of the Basin. Before 1991, the Soviet Union and Iran treated the Caspian as a shared lake in which they alone held any rights. These rights were based on the two treaties they signed in 1921 and 1940. The collapse of the Soviet Union, however, produced three new littoral states (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan). At the time of this writing (mid 1999) the five countries have not agreed whether the Caspian is a "lake" or a "sea" This characterization of the region would determine how the resources will be divided and managed. A final solution for the Caspian's legal status is necessary.

Finally, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan are land-locked, unlike the Persian Gulf producers they can not ship their oil by tankers from domestic ports. Their oil has to be transported to the target markets by pipelines that cross multiple international boundaries. Thus, the process of choosing and constructing pipeline routes is complicated and requires delicate negotiations between many parties. The existence of multiple export routes could increase the energy security of both exporters and importers by making exports less subject to technical or political disruptions on any one route. However, security will have to be balanced by economic feasibility since a large number of pipelines would mean smaller economies of scale and greater expenses for each project.[35]

Given these geo-political obstacles (lack of accurate assessment, disagreement on the legal status, and competition over export routes)

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[33] International Institute for Strategic Studies, Strategic Survey, New York: Oxford University Press, 1998, p.24.

[34] James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy, Unlocking the Assets: Energy and the Future of Central Asia and the Caucasus: A Political, Economic, and Cultural Analysis, Houston, Texas: Rice University Press, April 1998, p.2.

[35] International Energy Agency, Caspian Oil and Gas, Paris, 1998, p.37.

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one can conclude that in spite of the promising energy resources in the Caspian, it will take some time and huge financial investments before the region achieves its potentials and becomes a major player in world energy market. The Caspian will not replace the Persian Gulf as the major world oil reservoir. Still, the development of the Caspian resources would add more players to the global energy market which would enhance energy security. This diversity of suppliers is echoed by a similar process on the demand side.

II. The Demand Side

Two major characteristics of world oil demand can be identified: a substantial increase of consumption and a huge disparity in the amount of oil consumed (both in absolute terms and on per capita basis) between developed and underdeveloped countries. In 1950, world oil production stood at 10 million b/d, but within 20 years it had risen to 45 million b/d, a staggering near five-fold increase.[36] This was mainly the consequence of the expanding need for oil to sustain post-second World War rehabilitation and the subsequent rapid growth of the world's industrialized economies – most notably in western Europe and Japan – in a situation where their economies's previous dependence on coal could not be sustained.[37] For the next decades, world oil consumption continued to grow. In the early 1990s, however, oil demand was relatively flat: oil consumption worldwide was only 1 million b/d higher in 1993 than it was in 1989.[38] Since then the world's demand for oil has risen by almost 7 million b/d.[39] For the foreseeable future, there is a general agreement among virtually all observers of the industry that world oil demand will continue to be on the rise. For example, the Paris-based International Energy Agency projects an increase in oil demand of 1.9 percent per year between 1995 and 2020.[40] This means that worldwide demand

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[36] C.J. Campbell, The Coming Oil Crisis, Essex, England: Multi-Science Publishing Company, 1997, p.49.

[37] Peter R. Odell, "Oil Reserves: Much More Than Meets The Eye," Petroleum Economist, Vol.64, No.11, November 1997, p.29.

[38] Energy Information Administration, International Energy Outlook, Washington DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1998, p.25.

[39] Energy Information Administration, International Petroleum Statistics Report, Washington DC: United States Government Printing Office, April 1999, p.45.

[40] International Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook, Paris, 1998, p.89.

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for oil will reach approximately 115 million b/d in 2020.[41]

This substantial increase in world oil demand, however, has not been equal between rich and poor countries. Levels of oil consumption are markedly higher in the rich North than in the poor South (also, there is a large variation within each region). On a per capita basis, the North uses 9 times as much energy as the South.[42] This large gap can be explained by the difference in the level of industrialization between the two regions. The demand for oil is highly income-elastic. This disparity in affluence is most apparent in the transportation sector where petroleum fuels have only limited competition form other energy sources. Rising income rapidly transmits into a strong preference for personal transport.[43] Thus, it can be argued that most of the incremental demand for oil will occur in response to rise in vehicle ownership and other forms of travelling. In the next two decades, two important developments are likely to shape the parameters of world oil demand: the growing concern in the industrialized countries over energy efficiency as symbolized by the signing of Kyoto Protocol in December 1997 and the path and speed of economic growth in developing countries particularly in south-east Asian states.

The increasing worldwide concern over the environment, particularly in the developed countries is a major factor in shaping the global demand for fossil fuels. The signing of Kyoto Protocol in Japan on December 11, 1997 by 160 countries can be seen as an embodiment of these environmental concerns. The protocol legally binds industrialized countries to reducing their collective emissions of six green-house gases (GHGs) to 5.2 percent below 1990 levels by 2008-12.[44] Research done at the Center for Global Energy Study in London suggests that implementation of the Kyoto protocol would

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[41] Energy Information Administration, Annual Energy Outlook, Washington DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1999, p.2.

[42] Joshua S. Goldstein, Xiaoming Huang, and Burcu Aka, "Energy in the World Economy, 1950-92," International Studies Quarterly, Vol.41, No.2, 1997, p.246.

[43] Paul Stevens, "Oil Prices: The Start of an Era?" Energy Policy, Vol.24, No.5, 1996, p.396.

[44] Shokri Ghanem, Rezki Lounnas, Davoud Ghasemzadeh and Garry Brennand, "Oil and Energy Outlook to 2020: Implications of the Kyoto Protocol," OPEC Review, Vol.22, No.2, June 1998, p.73.

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result in a 4.5 million b/d reduction in world oil consumption.[45] This implementation, however, is highly uncertain. Many details are still waiting for negotiations between different parties and the ratification of the agreement by the legislatures of each signatory. Thus, some analysts conclude that "Kyoto may have been a historic agreement, but it is not the final solution.[46]" This uncertainty regarding the full implication of Kyoto and how far it would affect oil consumption in developed countries is echoed in any attempt to project the resumption of sharp economic growth in south east Asian states.

For the last few decades, one of the most dramatic developments in oil industry has been the expanding share of the Asian Pacific region in world oil demand. Limited energy resources and soaring economic growth meant that the region became the engine driving higher global oil demand. Accordingly, from 1990 to 1996 total energy demand for south east Asian states grew at an average rate of 5.5 percent per year, compared to the world average of 1.5 percent per year.[47] This strong oil demand, however, was severely interrupted by the economic crisis which swept the region beginning by the summer of 1997 and continued to deepen for most of 1998. Thus, instead of the expected 1 million b/d increase in demand, the region's requirements fell by almost 500,000 b/d.[48] Asian (and the world) oil demand forecasts for the next few years are strongly affected by the timing and pace of the region's economic recovery. Many analysts believe that in few years the region will resume its fast economic growth and, again, will lead the world in future oil demand growth. Within developing Asia, China occupies a central stage in terms of economic growth and energy policy.

This special significance of China in the global energy market can be explained by two factors: Beijing is the most populated country in the world and has been able to sustain one of the highest economic growth rate in the world for more than a decade. The

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[45] Ahmad Zaki Yamani, "Perspective and Retrospective: Oil Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow," Middle East Economic Survey, Vol.41, No.49, December 7, 1998, (on line).

[46] Stewart Boyle, "The Kyoto Protocol," Energy Economist, No.202, August 1998, p.9.

[47] Energy Information Administration, East Asia: The Energy Situation, Washington DC: United States Government Printing Office, July 1998, (on line).

[48] Oil and Gas Journal, "Supply-demand disparity tops 1998 oil trends," Vol.97, No.10, March 10, 1999, p.35.

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availability of reliable energy resources has been an important prerequisite for achieving this impressive economic performance. Systematic exploration of China began after the Second World War and was rewarded by the discovery in 1955 and 1959 respectively of two major field complexes at Karamay and Daqing, which together hold 40% of the country's total.[49] With these two discoveries, Beijing achieved a net exporter status.[50] However, these indigenous oil resources were not large enough to satisfy the country's expanding demand for energy. In November 1993 China became a net oil importing country and was forced to abandon its policy of self-sufficiency. In order to ensure sufficient and reliable energy resources, the Chinese government has pursued a twofold policy: energy market reform and encouraging foreign investment.

For the last several years, China has started a process of gradually removing all direct and indirect subsidies to energy enterprises so that prices would reflect their economic costs in order to stimulate energy production and promote price-induced conservation.[51] On the other side, China has been reluctant to open its energy sector to foreign investment. But, as other producers have done, Beijing has invited international oil companies to explore and develop its resources particularly in the far western basins (Junggar, Tarim, and Turpan.[52]) Simultaneously, China started looking for investment opportunities overseas in the Caspian Basin, the Persian Gulf and in Latin America. The most significant agreement was in Kazakhstan in 1997 where China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) won the Aktyubinsk field.[53]

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[49] C.J. Campbell, "As Depletion Increases, Energy Demand Rises," Petroleum Economist, Vol.64, No.9, September 1997, p.113.

[50] Alan Jones, Giovanella D'Andrea and German Rodriguez, "China: Energy Sector Growth Vital for Further Economic Development," Petroleum Economist, Vol.64, No.9, September 1997, p.72.

[51] Mehmet Ogutcu, "China and the World Energy System: New Links," The Journal of Energy and Development, Vol.23, No.2, June 1998, p.293.

[52] William F. Martin, Ryukicki Imai, and helga Steeg, Maintaining Energy Security in a Global Context, New York: The Trilateral Commission, September 1996, p.60.

[53] According to this deal, the CNPC agreed to invest $4.3 billion over the next 20 years making it China's biggest investment abroad ever. For more details see International Institute for Strategic Studies, Strategic Survey, New York: Oxford University Press, 1998, p.26.

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These energy policies, both at home and abroad, are projected to provide Beijing with its energy needs for the next several years. These needs (i.e., China's energy consumption) are expected to rise by 4.5 percent annually between 2000 and 2020.[54] During this period, China will most likely import about 4.6 million b/d from abroad, virtually all of which is expected to come from the Persian Gulf and the Caspian Basin.[55] This growing Chinese dependence on the Gulf and the Caspian has important geo-strategic and security implications. Increasingly, China will have to compete with another dominant foreign power - the United States - over influence in these two regions.

III. Concluding Remarks and the American role

Three conclusions can be drawn from the foregoing analysis of recent developments in the supply and demand sides of the oil industry. First, at the turn of the century, the international oil markets are much less concentrated than they were before the price shocks of the early 1970s. There are more producers and more consumers and the relative significance of many players have substantially changed. Second, the constant technological advances have added immense reserves and production to what the world has. Still, the availability of more resources does not guarantee energy security. Increasingly energy security is less about the availability of these resources and more about overcoming political and strategic restrains which hinder their full utilization. The situation with Iraq and Iran and the issues of choosing pipelines in the Caspian Basin are good illustration of how policy, not economics, can prevent, or delay, the full development of rich resources. Third, a main characteristic of the global oil market at the dawn of the new millennium is high level of interdependence. The globalization of oil markets has made the question of who sells and who buys a particular barrel of oil less and less relevant. The recent economic and energy crisis in South East Asian states was felt in many other regions in the world. Thus, more cooperation between all players in the global oil market would ensure adequate supplies and reasonable prices.

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[54] International Energy Agency, Caspian Oil and Gas, Paris, 1998, p.95.

[55] Energy Information Administration, International Energy Outlook, Washington DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1999, p.31.

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Within this framework, the United States' role deserves special attention for at least two reasons. First, Washington is the world's largest oil importing nation and American oil companies are giant players in terms of both technology and capital. In other words, the United States has tremendous leverage in shaping the economy of oil. Second, since the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, the United States has become the only remaining superpower. This means that Washington enjoys special influence in punishing or rewarding oil producers and consumers. In short, Washington's political and strategic interests have important impact on the international oil market.

Given these two characteristics, it is important to point out that the United States' dependence on imported oil is setting records as domestic production of oil slowly declines. In 1950, the United States provided 52 percent of the world's crude oil production; by 1997 that figure had dropped to 10 percent.[56] This declining production in conjunction with rising demand lead to deepening dependence on imported oil. Thus, the share of oil consumption met by imports is projected to rise from 49% in 1997 to 65% in 2020.[57] In response to this current and projected increasing dependence on imported oil, Washington has shown growing interest in the continuing diversification of world oil resources both for competitive reasons and to reduce the effects of a disruption from any one source on total world supplies.[58] A major exception to this policy of diversification is the policy toward Iran and Iraq. This policy involves a contradiction between two goals: economic (promoting the interests of American corporations abroad) and strategic (punishing regimes whose policies are perceived as a threat to American national security). Given this contradiction, there are pressures on the governments of the United States and other importing countries to find a way to reconcile their differences with Iran and Iraq as well as to pursue further development of the Caspian resources.

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[56] Energy Information Administration, 25th Anniversary of the 1973 Oil Embargo, Washington DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1998 (on line).

[57] Energy Information Administration, Annual Energy Outlook, Washington DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1999, p.5.

[58] John H. Lichtblau, "US Caspian Area Foreign Policy in Conflict with Resource Plans," Oil and Gas Journal, Vol.95, No.32, August 11, 1997, p.19.

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Culture and Geopolitics in the Age of Oprah

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New York

The relationship between geopolitics and geostrategy on the one hand, and mass media, propaganda and cultural change on the other, must be re-examined in light of radical changes in information, communications and military technology.

Key Words: Television, cultural politics, military technology, information warfare, media politics, geopolitics, presidential image, communications technology

If the first part of the 20th Century can be regarded as the Age of Churchill, and the second part beginning, say, in 1945, as the Age of Eisenhower, the last part of the century is the Age of Oprah. The West in general and America in particular has moved from an age of heroic action, to an age of heroic leadership, to an age when all that is need for heroism is the right emotion – or at least the right emotion properly expressed on television.

It can be said that the Age of Oprah began on November 22, 1963. When JFK was shot it became a television "event." No matter how real the emotions, television by its nature reduced it to a moment of worldwide sentimentality. Less than two decades before, when FDR died, the dominant media, radio and newspapers somehow left the readers and listeners with enough emotional space to be able to mourn, honestly and publicly, without their true feelings of tragic loss being drowned out by seemingly all-consuming, TV-generated emotionalism.

Oprah Winfrey herself was not 10 years old at the time. By 1973, when she began her TV career, television was already well established as a global power. TV had been the principal instrument of America's civil rights revolution and the whole course of the Vietnam War, according to one myth, had already been determined by the images the networks presented to the public.

The previous ten years were the beginning of what Francis Fukuyama has called "The Great Disruption." As he puts it, "Beginning in about 1965, a large number of indicators that can serve

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as negative measures of social capital all started moving upward rapidly at the same time." According to him, the damage was concentrated in what he describes as "three broad categories: crime, family and trust."[1] While he rejects, at least in part, the idea that the disruption was caused by changing cultural standards away from what he calls "Victorian Values" which could be more easily regarded as the values of middle class Western Civilization, he seems to underestimate the role of television in amplifying negative social trends.

Outside of America, TV was still almost an entirely government owned and controlled medium. By 1983, governments in Western Europe could no longer hope to completely control TV, so they settled for variants of the mixed public/private system pioneered by the British.

By 1983, certain events – what the French began to call "les grandes messe televisuel," – became national and even global moments, shared by millions and millions of people. The 1969 moon landing was, perhaps, the first and greatest of these, but others have included the fall of the Berlin Wall, the Gulf War, the death of Princess Diana and, in America, the Barbara Walters' interview with Monica Lewinsky.

On a daily basis, the emotional power of TV is deployed through all sorts of shows, but none have been more powerful or more successful than the Oprah show. It is no accident that the subtitle of one of the many books about her is "Insight From the World's Most Influential Voice."[2]

Note that she is referred to as the "world's most influential voice," not America's nor even North America's, assuming that U.S. TV has the power and influence north of the border that Canadian cultural nationalists claim. The most significant fact about world geopolitics in the last decade, the Climax of the Age of Oprah, has been the inescapable reality of U.S. hegemony. America is the one state that stands above all others, in the military, economic, technological and cultural spheres. It is not all-powerful, but it is the

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[1] Francis Fukuyama, The Great Disruption: Human Nature and the Reconstruction of Social Order, p. 27, The Free Press, New York 1999

[2] Janet Lowe, Oprah Winfrey Speaks: Insight From the World's Most Influential Voice, John Wiley, New York 1998

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most powerful. It calls itself the indispensable nation.

Historically, hegemonic powers have, as part of their hegemony, acquired what is called "soft" or cultural power as a byproduct of their military, economic and political strength. The relationship among these forms of power is not easy to calculate or quantify, especially now, when hard power and soft power are so intimately related. The new synthesis that has emerged in the last decade has been called "American Hyperpower" by the French Foreign Minister. The problem of how, when and where to use this power, and how to preserve it, is the most difficult problem American leaders will face in the next few decades. It involves fitting American military and diplomatic strategy together with American political ideals and American economic interests. Essentially, the problem is how to fit U.S. grand strategy into global geopolitical reality.

Geopolitics and geostrategy are words that get used a lot both by statesmen and by those who write about them. Geopolitics, in the usual sense of the term, refers to the application of geographic knowledge to international politics, yet it is often used as if the term were meant to include the formulation of Grand Strategy, i.e., the overall military and diplomatic goals a nation state sets for itself. Geostrategy within this context refers to the largely military side of the pursuit of Grand Strategic goals. The term strategy, which originates in the Greek world for General (Strategos), is defined in one dictionary as "the science and art of employing the political, economic, psychological and military forces of a nation, or group of nations, to afford the maximum support for adopted policies in peace or war.[3]

The French Admiral, Raoul Castex (1878-1968), is often referred to as the "Unknown Strategist." One of his ideas was that in every age there exists a perturbateur, a nation which by its nature disturbs the settled order. His favorite examples were the Hapsburg Empire of Charles the Fifth in the early Sixteenth Century, France at the time of the French Revolution, both Imperial and Nazi Germany and, after 1917, the Soviet Union. This kind of power is, by his definition, that against which the other powers must unite to defeat or at least constrain.

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[3] Webster's Third New International Dictionary, Springfield, Massachusetts 1976

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"Its essential characteristic is youth, vitality and the possession of an untapped storehouse of human energy,...The perturbateur, powerful in manpower, in resources, in policy and in arms, overtly manifests the intention of absorbing and erasing its neighbors."[4]

Most Americans would laugh at the idea that this described their country, but numerous Canadians and Mexicans would accept that it has at least some validity when applied to their giant neighbor. Their complaints about "cultural imperialism" are, in some ways, perfectly valid.

Complaints from overseas are, in many ways, normal. Referring to European attitudes, Isaiah Berlin wrote of an "...America which knows so much, to them seems to understand too little."[5] America has been and still is a moralistic, meddlesome, idealistic power whose desire to spread American ideas about freedom, democracy and capitalist prosperity is sometimes accompanied by a desire to pressure people into giving up smoking, booze, red meat (or at other times forcing them to accept American hormone-treated beef,) traditional phraseology, female genital mutilation and other fashionable causes. This irritates those countries whose history teaches them to value stability above all else because for them instability and change mean war, invasion, massacre and misery.

The overwhelming nature of U.S. power at the end of the 20th Century is not something that can be easily analyzed with the traditional tools of geopolitical theory. They are, however, a place to start from.

Geopolitics and Geopoliticians

The rules of basic geopolitical theory as they were developed between the 1890's and the 1940's were meant to apply to the great European empires as they existed at the end of the 19th Century. Brzezinski described them as: "Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland; Who rules the Heartland commands the World Island; Who rules the World Island commands the World."

It was the British geographer and statesman, Sir Halford

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[4] Raoul Castex, Eugenia C. Kiesling, ed., *Strategic Theories*, p. 404, Naval INstitute Press, Annapolis, Md. 1994

[5] Isaiah Berlin, The Proper Study of Mankind, Winston Churchill in 1940, p. 624, Farrer Straus Giroux, New York 1998

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Mackinder (1861-1947), who in his 1904 paper, "The Geographical Pivot of History," first laid out what became known as the "Heartland Theory" on which classical geopolitics is based. These theories are complementary to Mahan's contemporaneous theories of seapower. They began with the idea that since Columbus' first voyage, the world has become a "closed system," with every littoral region connected by sea to every other littoral region.[6] Mackinder discerned that landpower and seapower depended for their effectiveness on very different types of geography. As he put it in his 1919 book, "Democratic Ideals and Reality, "the Heartland is the region to which under modern conditions seapower can be refused access."[7]

Traditional geopolitics was thus about landpower and seapower. Later, it came to include Airpower, Nuclear power and Space power. Today any reckoning of national power will include cultural power, information-warfare power and cultural cyberpower. American political leaders have for the most part been uncomfortable with grand theories of strategy. American democracy has never been comfortable with the idea of geopolitics. Indeed, Americans like Brzezinski often use the term "geostrategy" when they mean geopolitics. The traditional American suspicion of "subtle Europeans" and the constant need to be able to explain policy goals in clear, simple language that the people can be persuaded to rally round will always make any policy based on something like the Heartland Theory a hard sell.

Unfortunately, once a strategic theory is accepted by the American people it takes a catastrophe or a political struggle of cosmic proportions to change it. **Insurgency, limited war etc. etc. and quickly disproven. [Roger, what sense can be made of the preceding sentence, and what role does it play in the context of the sentences that precede and follow it?]** Mutually assured destruction is one theory that has now built up such an institutional following that it still dominates American strategy long after its original purpose has been forgotten.

Yet, the mother of all successful geopolitical strategies is the one its author has spent decades trying to discredit. George Kennan's

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[6] W.H. Parker, Mackinder, Geography As an Aid to Statecraft, p.149, Oxford 1982
[7] Ibid, p. 165

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containment theory of 1947 is the one strategic theory that, once accepted, was held onto by most American leaders until 1991. The tenacity with which America clung to the Containment strategy and the ferocity with which the Soviets denounced it, should have been a sign as to how well it was working. Yet, it was constantly being referred to as the "discredited containment theory" or the "obsolete cold war containment theory."

American's liberal elite accepted containment as a long-term strategy. Conservatives had a harder time learning to live with a concept that held out little hope of immediate or even medium term victory. Gradually, however, they accepted it as the only viable alternative. Eisenhower's administration followed a balanced foreign policy based on containment, world economic growth and decolonization. Ike did a better job of explaining his policies than any cold war president except Reagan.

The Fifties saw the massive growth of new mass communication technologies – television of course, but also the transistor radio which changed the nature of the radio business, and the increase in sales of Hi Fi record players which taken together made recorded music a much more pervasive part of everyday life that ever before. Yet, for Washington and for the government, communications still were based on the technology of the Second World War. Telephones, scrambled or not, using manually operated switchboards, teletypes and telegraphs were the primary ways the government communicated with itself. Newspapers and news magazines were seen by most leaders as the main way to reach the public, though radio and movie newsreels were still important. Television was obviously going to dominate the future. Few people in or out of government realized just how image would overwhelm the spoken word. TV was seen by many in Washington as nothing more than an entertainment medium, unworthy of serious thought.

The famous Nixon-Kennedy debate of 1960 was the first indication to politicians of how important television and television image was going to be to their profession. Most politicians realized that image was not just one important part of their job. In the age of TV it was their job. JFK understood this and excelled at creating both the warm fuzzy images that appealed to women and the strong, masculine images that confirmed him as the Commander in Chief.

LBJ, to put it mildly, did not understand this. He relied

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exclusively on the manipulative skills he'd developed in the Senate. The combination of nagging and bullying that characterized his presidential style worked in the U.S. only to the extent that the majority of Americans had been already convinced to support both Civil Rights and an expanded welfare state. Overseas, his style aroused the instinctive contempt of leaders from Harold Wilson and Charles DeGaulle to Ho Chi Minh and Nyguen Van Thieu. His was the most miserably failed presidency in U.S. history.

The mid to late sixties, the years of LBJ's Vietnam war, were the years when the American Left, or what is now known as the "Cultural Left," began its climb to power. It began from a strong base in the liberal media and in liberal circles in Hollywood and New York. The story of how the Left cleansed the liberals from their dominant position in U.S. cultural life and achieved hegemony is an old one. Basically the old liberals of the Stewart Alsop/Hubert Humphrey variety no longer believed in themselves and the Left was willing to support just about anybody to get rid of them.[8]

Since 1975 cultural politics in America has been the story of the resistance put up by non-Leftists in an attempt to break the power of the Left over American cultural life. As each new form of communication technology is developed a fierce struggle over its control is inevitable. Cable TV, Satellite TV and the Internet are all the objects of merciless fights for political regulatory and economic control.

Intellectually, Nixon understood the importance of Image and cultural politics, but he could do little with his understanding except to send Spiro Agnew out to complaint about the "nattering Nabobs of Negativism" and to call for support from "the silent majority". His efforts to fight the Culture War on the political battlefield failed. The powers that controlled the media simply did not care what the silent majority thought – a situation which has not changed in thirty years.

After Nixon, the Presidency itself began to adapt to the requirements of the Age of Oprah. In the latest addition to his memoirs Kissinger writes, doubtless with the politics of the 1990s in mind, that "The modern politician is less interested in being a hero

[8] John Silber, The Betrayal of Liberalism IX, The New Criterion, May 1999

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than in being a superstar... Heroes are defined by inner values, stars by consensus. When a candidate's views are forged in focus groups and ratified by television anchorpersons, insecurity and superficiality become congenital."[9]

That Nixon, Kissinger, Ford, Bush and Dole had all served more or less heroically in World War Two in an odd way disqualified them from leadership in the Age Of Oprah. JFK had been a real, but minor, hero in the South Pacific. His media-wise advisers (not yet known as Image Consultants) manufactured a heroic legend around an incident that needed no embellishment as an act of courage, but needed considerable modification to fit within the strict requirements of Hollywood-style storytelling.

No one understood the limitations of the new politics better than Reagan, who not only understood the need for limiting the number of big ideas he tried to sell the public, but who understood the need to shape his policies around stories that the public could understand and relate to. That Reagan used the tools of the Age of Oprah to sell ideas and values truly based in the Age of Churchill was just one of the many ironies of his Presidency. The most important thing about the Reagan Presidency was that he changed the mindset of America and of the West in general from resigned defeatism to strategic optimism. Like Churchill in 1940, Reagan realized that the West was far from beaten and that the Soviet Union's seemingly invincible might was based on bluff and western weakness.

Reagan directly engaged the Soviets in a gigantic media and propaganda war over Arms Control and the Euromissile deployment. The Communists and their allies went all-out trying to make the world fear the "nuclear mad cowboy Reagan" and to block the Americans using "peace" as a weapon. Reagan countered with an even stronger weapon – "Hope" – and won the battle and later the war.

In 1985, as the Cable industry was moving into the majority of U.S. homes, the most mediagenic Soviet leader ever took power in Moscow. It was not that Gorbachev was particularly charming or handsome. It was simply that he was much livelier than the quasi-cadavers that had been leading the USSR since the mid-sixties.

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[9] Henry Kissinger, Years of Renewal, p. 29, Simon and Schuster, New York 1999

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Through no fault of his own Gorby acquired "Star Power." In the light of history he is seen as a failure, the man who tried to save Imperial Communism from itself and in doing so hastened its collapse. At the time, from 1985 till 1991, he was the darling of the western media. His communication skills were at best rudimentary, but as the leader of the world's most powerful left wing power he was able to "get away with everything."

George Bush, by contrast, could get away with nothing. His encounter with an advanced version of a supermarket scanner was used to illustrate how "out of touch" he was with ordinary people. His lack of media skill was a flaw that a Democratic president with real accomplishments might have overcome. Bush was never given a chance.

Clinton is the ultimate Age of Oprah president. Elected over the objection of a majority of America's male voters, he has ruled without much regard for the traditional male virtues. The war against Yugoslavia over Kosovo is archetypical of what could be called the High Age of Oprah. Image controls emotion and emotion controls politics. This is what they mean when they refer to the CNN factor. Today in Central Africa a huge war is going on. It involves countries from Angola to Libya; yet it is all but invisible, without even minimal images. Therefore it might as well be taking place on another planet.

What happened in May and June of 1989 in China was a good example of why revolutions in the Age of Oprah are, above all, television events. The students and their supporters knew that they had at least some room to maneuver as long as the TV cameras were turned on. As the days and weeks went by they became better and better at giving the cameras what they wanted. Putting up the statue "Goddess of Liberty" was a stroke of genius. The repression of the students on live TV undid generations of work by left-wing "friends of China," such as Edgar Snow and John Fairbanks. The Chinese Communist rulers in their compound at Zhongnanhai lost that "mandate of heaven" which had been bestowed on them by American TV at the time of Nixon's 1972 visit. In the Age of Oprah, TV giveth and TV taketh away.

A struggle for autonomy on China's Western periphery has also gotten the Beijing government into trouble. Tibet's Dalai Lama is the soft power equivalent of Field Marshal Erwin Rommel. On a hundred media battlefields he has taken on the Chinese government

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and left them beaten, confused and in retreat. He has, without really wanting to, joined company with DeGaulle, Ghandi, Castro and Bill Clinton, as a darling of the "Hollywood community." How ironic it is that the movie industry had such good relations with the Chinese Communists during the Cultural Revolution, but now condemns them.

The Chinese have always understood the importance of "face." Their traditions should, therefore, perfectly prepare them for media politics in the Age of Oprah. So why is their image so bad? Maybe it's just the curse of the overdog. Western, and above all American, sensibilities are geared toward sympathy with the underdog. Sometimes the sympathy is deserved and sometimes not, but when China ceased to be a miserably poor Communist nation and became a modernizing Asian "tiger economy" it lost the benefits of automatic underdog status.

Even more difficult for China to swallow is that the underdog status that had been so valuable to its image has now been assumed by Taiwan. That offshore democratic bastion of anti-Communism, hated by the American Left, is now threatened by 'the huge continental bully.' The Chinese and the Taiwanese know it is more complicated than that, and yet that is how it looks on CNN: the elements that go into the traditional Asian concept of "face" do not play well on TV. Any Chinese attack on Taiwan would look as unjustified on Western TV as Saddam's 1990 attack on Kuwait.

Before the Cox Report was released, the story or stories of Chinese espionage and campaign contributions was not a real scandal for the simple reason that there are no compelling images. If the TV news organizations wanted to, however, they could splice together images of Chinese rockets, including the bootleg footage of the one that blew up with the Hughes Communications Satellite on board and other footage, to make a compelling set of images.

In the Age of Oprah any story that takes too long to tell or that does not fit the overall story line is an "unstory" in the same way that in 1984 political enemies of the state became "unpersons". **[Roger, what is he referring to here about 1984?]** The story is still alive but disconnected and certainly not being covered obsessively as, for example, the Littleton story is.

The accidental bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade on the night of the May 7, 1999, is like the shootings at Littleton – a very

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useful incident. The Chinese have found that they could milk it to attack the U.S. on several fronts and maintain what is called, without sarcasm, the "moral high ground" from which they can throw thunderbolts of indignation at the U.S. At the same time, it was useful to mobilize the Chinese population against foreigners. Ferocious-looking demonstrations outside the U.S. Embassy may do little good for China's image in the eyes of U.S. investors, but it is very useful in reminding the world that China is not a power to be taken lightly. Television images are the tools of today's propaganda. Tomorrow, the Internet will be the ideal tool of political communication.

The Internet, or Cyberspace, was invented by the U.S. military as an emergency communication system. Unlike land, sea, air or space power, Cyberpower is not based on being able to dominate physical space. The whole idea of trying to dominate the Internet is as silly as trying to dominate the airspace over Iraq by manipulating the air molecules. That Cybernetworks and the Internet could be a dangerous, vulnerable area is something the U.S. has been thinking about.

In 1995, a fascinating article appeared in the U.S. Naval Institute's Proceedings. It described the imaginary defeat of the U.S. Navy at the hands of the PLA Navy in a short nasty campaign called the Spratly War of 2006. Among the deadliest political weapons of that war, "videoclips showing the burning and helpless U.S. ships, appeared on the Internet and were shown on all the evening newscasts. Of particular horror were U.S. sailors in life rafts being attacked by sharks,..." In a note, the author mentions that these horrible pictures had been digitally tampered with.[10]

The potential of the Internet as a propaganda weapon to be used by the weak against the strong is obvious. The Zapatista revolutionaries in southern Mexico have done almost all their fighting in Cyberspace, and have won some notable victories there. In most ways, Cyberpower is just a new form of propaganda warfare. The capability of a tiny group or even just one individual to cause real pain using Cyberpower was obvious from the beginning. This is why

[10] Commander Frank C. Borik, USN, Sub Tzu and the Art of Submarine Warfare, USNI Proceedings, November 1995

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extremist groups, long denied any legitimate outlet for their beliefs, jumped into the field of Internet propaganda with both feet.

Other groups with more plausible forms of "victimhood" to sell can use the Internet not only for propaganda but as an organizing tool. There is evidence that the Kurdish PKK in Europe has used the Internet as well as cellular phone networks to organize the violent demonstrations that occurred after the Turks captured their leader Ocelan. Still, the best use of the Internet by anyone seeking to either change or buttress the existing order is as a form of "Cultural Cyberpower."

When it comes to the question of how to use Cultural Power, the Europeans should be the experts. To them, the idea of cultural power is not something vaguely alien or old fashioned. It is something many of them feel subjected to every day. The power of American popular culture is overwhelming, all the more so because it is in no way government-subsidized or government-directed. It is a product, intended to be sold to paying customers, for profit. It is not, like so many of the great works of European high culture, the result of the delicate interaction between an artist and a patron. It is a direct attack on the consumer's wallet, via his emotions.

This feeling of being oppressed by American cultural power is one of the driving forces behind the emerging European Political Union. Few Europeans know who Oprah Winfrey is, but they live in the Age of Oprah and they don't particularly like it. The desire to escape from under American tutelage has real geopolitical consequences: European political Union could radically undermine U.S. global hegemony, or so they believe.

Even more than American economic or military power, European geopoliticians, such as Marisol Touraine, see American culture as the truly important factor in American world power. "...c'est la base de leur rayonnement international: boire du Coca-cola ou porter des jeans c'est se retrouver dans la civilization americaine."[11]

Europeans have sought to throw off the yoke of American popular culture by giving their ministries of culture larger and larger sums of taxpayers' money to subsidize the creation of "French

[11] Marisol Touraine, Le Bouleversement du Monde: Geopolitique du XXIe siecle, p332, Seuil, Paris 1995 ("...it's the basis of their international influence: if one drinks Coke or wears jeans, one is already part of American civilization.")

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Cinema" or of a "European Audiovisual Space." To an American this might seem like an expensive joke. To Hollywood this system is a training program for new talent, funded by their would-be competitors. To the European elites this is deadly serious; it is a question of who will control their children's minds. It is not just an effort to reestablish the kind of relationship Pope Julius II had with Michelangelo; it is a last ditch struggle to seize back power over of their civilization's collective dreams.

Since the end of World War Two, America has worked for European unity. The Marshall Plan was based in part on the idea that the Europeans, working together, knew better what was good for themselves than any group of Americans no matter how smart or well-intentioned. Later America supported the idea of the Coal and Steel community, and all subsequent moves toward European integration have been more or less automatically endorsed by the U.S. During the Cold War, to strengthen Europe was to strengthen the anti-Communist alliance. Since then, there has been a vague, inconsistent push to help the EU become a serious partner, a fellow Hegemon. As Brzezinski plainly puts it: "...a clear-cut American commitment to the eventual acceptance of Europe as America's global partner."[12]

The first decade of the post-Cold War period can, with little exaggeration, be called the time of "The Identity Wars". The states that have emerged from the wreckage of the Soviet Empire have all had to reestablish or invent a national identity. In the EU, these post-Cold War problems became part of the debate over whether to "broaden or deepen" the Union. The self-imposed mission of the Euro-idealists – to create a zone of peace and prosperity in the space where, for the first half of the century, there was almost nothing but war and its effects – fits nicely into American geopolitical goals.

The Age of Oprah is ideally suited to German politicians like the late Willy Brandt or Egon Bahr or Hans Dietrich Gensher or the new Green Party foreign minister, Joschka Fischer. Such men thrive in an age when emotionalism has replaced statecraft, and when showing the right degree of sympathy for the downtrodden has become a substitute for doing anything to help them. Soft-hearted Euro-Global

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[12] Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard, p.72, Basic, New York 1997

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happy talk can often mask some pretty ruthless self-interested policies. Tax harmonization, for example, can be seen as an effort to inflict German levels of taxation on nations with Portuguese levels of productivity, all based on a wonderfully Oprahesque vision of "harmony."

In spite of a cultural budget that rivals that of France, Germany has achieved much less in the way of raw cultural power. Driving a Mercedes or a Volkswagen does not make one a part of German civilization. Drinking Beck's beer does not draw one to thoughts of Beethoven or Wagner. German economic success has not, at least in the last half century, generated the kind of Cultural Power Samuel Huntington had in mind when he asserted, "Cultural assertion follows material success; hard power generates soft power."[13] Certainly the German media conglomerate Bertelsmann can hold its own with Disney or Time Warner in size and profitability, but the content of what it sells is either American or American-influenced.

The French, in particular, object to the way globalization has hurt their creative elite, restricting them to minor, heavily subsidized 'national productions' or else forcing them to make 'Hollywood'-style movies. As one French movie mogul recently complained, "Aujourd'hui, le cinéma mondialisé cèlébre la disparition de la loi. Le héros solitaire, surhumain, armé, jusqu'aux dents résout la violance par la violance, en faisant éclater des cervelles a la chaîne."[14]

To force another culture to change the very nature of its products is the very soul of cultural power. The role of cultural power in world politics is the foundation of Samuel Huntington's famous "Clash of Civilizations" theory. Published in 1993, he not only got the attention of the foreign policy elite, but for a moment, at least, he got the attention of America's "chattering classes" – no small accomplishment since the chattering classes in the U.S. are usually more interested in the inner workings of Geffen-Spielburgia,

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[13] Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, p. 109, Simon and Schuster, New York 1996

[14] L'Express, 13.5.99: Interview with Marin Karmitz, "Le cinéma Mondialise´n'a plus de morale" – "Today globalized cinema celebrates the disappearance of law. It celebrates the solitary superhuman hero who, armed to the teeth solves the problems of violence with more and better violence, exploding brains on an assembly line basis."

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and what Cardinal Ratzinger called the "Pelvic Issues" – abortion, homosexuality, etc.

In Huntington's most recent look at his own theory,[15] he lets the air out of some exuberant gasbags, and announces quite definitely that the "Unipolar moment" is over. Stating the obvious is often a useful exercise and Huntington does so to the detriment of those who believe that American hegemony is always benign – benign because it is American, or at least because it is an American Hegemony led by themselves. He described what has emerged over the last decade as a "uni-multipolar world" – just a pit stop on the way to what he sees as a truly multipolar world that will emerge in twenty years or so.

Huntington enumerates a whole catalogue of American sins, a catalogue that could not have been better drafted at the Quai d'Orsay. America's sins boil down to throwing its weight around and imposing its values on other people. He indicts and convicts America of "judgementalism." Given what happened in Haiti, where one morally repugnant elite was replaced by another, one can hardly blame him.

Huntington reiterates the claim that non-Western elites see America as a cultural menace, not only to their own power but to the core values of their societies, or of their civilizations, – "... a menace to their integrity, autonomy, prosperity and freedom of action." Islam is not the only non-Western civilization to be angry with the "West." Russia, or what Huntington thinks of as Orthodox Civilization, is seriously disappointed with America. The humiliation of Russia over the question of Kosovo will not be soon forgotten; Moscow's sensitivity to any military action close to or inside its former sphere of influence is obvious. Weak as it is, Russia is constantly looking for ways to degrade and diminish U.S. power. Whether under communism or under the corrupt semi-democracy currently existing, the hostility remains.

The best evidence for this is the recent article by the *Financial Times* Kiev correspondent who writes in *Foreign Affairs* of the new Russian imperial philosophy of Eurasianism, "...a rallying point for Russia's right- and left-wing malcontents."[16] A bastardized version

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[15] Samuel P. Huntington, The Lonely Superpower, Foreign Affairs, March/April 1999

[16] Charles Clover, Dreams of the Eurasian Heartland: The Reemergence of Geopolitics, Foreign Affairs, March/April 1999

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of Mackinder embraced by the Communists and the neo-Fascists aims to gather a new coalition of "Russia, Japan, Germany and Iran, based on their shared rejection of the West...."
Militarily, the Russians might, in the future, become the core of such a new anti-Western or anti-American alliance. There is a 19th century military axiom that goes, "Russia is never as strong or as weak as she looks." Today, Russia looks pretty weak, but they are still building and designing new weapons, some of which, it can be confidently assumed, will be just as good as the ones America and its allies got to know and fear during the Cold War.

The Russians are also looking at new forms of warfare. In the field of information warfare, they might just turn out to be very good indeed. After all, the very primitiveness of their computer industry forced their software designers to develop ingenious ways to compensate for the inadequacies of the available hardware. Also, Russians have long been known to be excellent paper and pencil mathematicians. The U.S. Department of Defense might be fooling itself if it thinks America can maintain Cyberspace dominance just because America dominates the world's computer and information industries.

Actual Software War, the ability to plant or insert computer viruses or other programming sabotage weapons into an enemy's systems, is already here – but not for long. The whole idea of two sides throwing logic bombs at each other's computers may be a transitory phenomenon associated with stand-alone single-purpose systems. As the technology improves, the whole culture of hackers and computer crime will mutate. After all, the more money is transmitted over the I nternet, the more effort people, corporations and governments will put into making sure that the right people, corporations or governments get paid.

Meanwhile, military organizations are shifting from what Admiral Cebrowski and John Gartska, in their seminal January 1998 Proceedings article, called Platform-Centric warfare to Network-Centric warfare. They mean this to be a shift away from the idea of weapons systems, such as aircraft or tanks, working together on the battlefield according to a plan of battle, to achieve goals laid out by the commander, to something new. Network-Centric warfare is based on the idea that the quantum level of improvement in battlefield situational awareness means that the commander will have

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to make decisions much faster than in the past.

This sounds like the logical next step from what Soviet Marshal Orgakov called Reconnaissance Strike complexes back in the Eighties. At that time, the U.S. DoD referred to this as "Follow on Forces Attack." With Network-Centric warfare, the battle is won or lost in cyberspace. The critical micro-seconds before the missile strikes home, or before the tank's gun is fired, are now purely under the control of the network. This is a step beyond push-button warfare. This is the development of what Admiral Cebrowski and Garstka call a "...powerful warfighting ecosystem.."[17]

They are still talking about weapons in the sense that a weapon is a system for manipulating energy; but calling a weapon, even a Network-Centric weapon, an ecosystem is a delightful "Age of Oprah" touch. As things move into the inevitable cycle of measures and counter-measures, these networks and their associated systems of systems will become information fortresses, protected by complex firewalls, perhaps incorporating ingenious traps to deflect enemy software attacks, analogous to the 16th century star-shaped bastions designed to neutralize siege artillery.

The debates on how to use this new form of power are, in many ways, like the debates in the Twenties and Thirties on how to use air power, or the ones in the early years of the Cold War on nuclear strategy. One professor at the U.S. Navy's War College makes the comparison explicit, invoking the ghost of the much-discredited Italian air-power theorist, Giulio Douhet.

He points out that "... one man's information warfare is another man's international terrorism. If any hostile power tried even a smidgen of what we propose to do en masse via NCW (Network-Centric Warfare), we would be hurling all sorts of war crimes accusations,"[18] which could lead to some pretty odd-sounding counter-accusations: "They logic-bombed their own hospital!" and a whole new set of "the dog ate my homework excuses" (e.g., "The streets couldn't be plowed because the North Koreans put a virus in the satellite navigation controls").

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[17] Vice Admiral Arthur K. Cebrowski, USX and John Garstka, Network-Centric Warfare, Its Origin and Future, USNI Proceedings, January 1998

[18] Thomas P. M. Barnett, The Seven Deadly Sins of Network-Centric Warfare, USNI Proceedings, January 1999

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Obviously, any offensive use of information warfare will have to be highly selective. Fortunately, the huge investment the U.S. is making in information warfare should produce the software equivalent of precision-guided munitions, making it possible to wage "sensitive" information warfare – software with a light and elegant touch.

Where and when to use these information weapons is not going to be an easy question. In this kind of war, all targets are what RAF Air Marshal "Bomber" Harris disparagingly called "Panacea Targets." So it is probably best to look at Cyberspace as a new form of Human Geography – a virtual world created by the seamless interaction of electronic pulses and binary mathematics. The very language of the Internet indicates that no one has decided whether it is a wave to be surfed, an ocean to be navigated or a universe to be explored. Perhaps it is just a cash register to be looted. At any rate, nobody calls it "the information superhighway," except for ironic effect.

Whatever it turns out to be, the Internet is already one of the most important places on earth. Unfiltered access to the net is, in many places, a privilege reserved for the political elite. In China, the whole question of access to the net and how to restrict it is going to determine the shape of the telecommunications industry in the most populous nation on Earth. It is a debate that pits liberalizers against "hard core members of the Communist leadership who believe one firm can better limit the flow of information into China than many."[19] It is important to understand that even the most liberal Chinese official will never allow completely free Internet access for all Chinese citizens.

In the very near future, satellite phones, such as Iridium, will enable anyone with the right gear to quickly and cheaply access the Internet, without having to go through land lines or cell phone networks. Governments that want to limit citizens' access to the net will have to develop methods of detecting unauthorized satellite phone use. It will become the sort of cat and mouse game that resistance radio operators played in deadly earnest against the Gestapo detector trucks in Nazi-occupied Europe. Under these

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[19] John Pomfret, A Call For Competition in China, *The Washington Post* Weekly Edition, February 1, 1999

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circumstances, it will still be difficult for the government to tell the difference between a foreign businessman using his personal SATphone to talk to his company and a dissident using his to update a web site with information on the latest human rights violations.

Another price society has to pay is the fact that criminals and terrorists now have relatively secure communications available to them. New encryption technology has made the codebreaker's life a lot harder, but at least it works both ways and makes life more difficult for tyrants to keep their people under complete control. In the long run, it may make the kind of electronic intelligence-gathering the U.S. has become so good at less effective and force the U.S. to rely on old-fashioned, flesh and blood spies.

This new stew of technology and culture is politically powerful; no strategist or geopolitician can fail to see its impact on western civilization. French commentators have remarked on the new American Way of War: 'zero morts' (no deaths). Certainly not among Americans, and as few as possible among America's enemies. One of the apparent goals of this kind of warfare is to produce 'feel good' images on U.S. TV screens, while avoiding P.R. disasters like those that showed the body of a U.S. serviceman being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu.

Emotional manipulativeness is a natural part of the warfare of the weak. The powerless, and people who think they are powerless, will resort to violent mind games. To compensate for their nearly-empty arsenals they will learn to strike the right pose; heroic revolutionary or helpless victim, what matters is getting the image right. In this world an old man in a wheelchair is a legitimate target because of his symbolic value: his death will have a devastating emotional impact.

The change in recent years is not in the use of violence by terrorists claiming to be fighting for the weak, but how this girlish form of violence is now the preferred weapon of the strong. France Britain, Germany, Australia and even Sweden are rushing to equip themselves with long-range precision guided missiles and Laser guided bombs, not because they want to use these weapons to win wars, but because they want to be in a position to send this kind of 'message'. If firing a couple of dozen million-dollar cruise missiles will help get a politician elected, or more likely re-elected, he or she will naturally consider it a valid campaign expenditure. These are the

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ideal political weapon; after all, if a cruise missile is shot down there are no angry relatives to vote against the politician who sent it into harm's way.

This kind of thing is exactly the sort of post-heroic war that is more about communication and image than about the great issues of human destiny. When impoverished nations or peoples fight each other, the spectacle is one of unredeemed savagery, as in Rwanda. When advanced or relatively advanced nations fight each other, the nature of the imagery changes. The squalid nature of war is somehow disguised. Thus, at one extreme, warfighting is a computer programmer sitting in an air-conditioned office in Palo Alto writing a set of instructions that at some future point, unknown to the programmer, will make the difference between defeat and victory, perhaps without physically hurting anyone. At the other extreme is a drunken thug clubbing a child to death by a jungle roadside. Neither of these extremes comes close to what the modern professional warrior thinks of as war.

The drama of war is today reduced to soap opera. Will Saddam survive? How many civilians will die in Kosovo? Tune in tomorrow. The nature of TV has taught us to think in terms of stories, rather than in terms of goals and objectives or ends and means. The small-scale 'human interest story' overshadows larger, more tragic realities that take place off-screen. TV's reality is narcissistic to the core. A war is told-through-the-story-of-one-woman's-struggle. More often it is reduced to the 'Nintendo war' or the Bosnian war was reduced to 'mass rape.'

The traditional bad relations between the press, especially TV, and the military has become a small but omnipresent factor in military planning and in the conduct of operations. In March 1999, the Pentagon refused to release video tape of U.S. operations over the Iraqi No-Fly Zones because it does not want the images used to stir up sympathy for the Iraqis. Without the images, the media must still report on the operations, but the impact of their reporting is much weaker. So the relationship goes on, like a bad marriage that neither partner can escape. The media and the military go through the well-worn rituals, long emptied of passion or any deeper meaning.

Today in the Age of Oprah American power is deployed on behalf of American feelings. America is not a bully; America is a nag. In the past, hegemonic powers have chosen to be keepers of the

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Global Status Quo. That America should choose to try and make the world a better place, even if that effort puts its hegemony at risk, is admirable. Sadly, as can be seen in Kosovo, making the world a better place is a hard, risky business. "Feelings" are hardly a guide to effective strategy. Today, in the Age of Oprah, effective military strategy is not the first concern of the political leaders of the world's premier perturbateur.

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By Nicholas Dima Ph.D.

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Demographic Implications of the Declining Role of the Father in Western Society

Wade C. Mackey
Tomball College, Texas

As the 21st century begins, two very distinct versions of the father will compete for ascendancy across the world's community of cultures. One version is of very recent vintage and casts the role of the social father as supernumerary or optional. Cultures which adopt such a version tend to have high levels of divorce and out-of-wedlock births plus a pervasive cash economy as defining characteristics. The mother-child(ren) dyad becomes the familial unit of such societies. A second, older, version adheres the father to the mother-child(ren) dyad to form the traditional nuclear family. Without commenting upon desirability, it is argued that, when compared to alternative familial structures, those cultures which both minimize fatherless families and systematically restrict women's roles to that of motherhood do and will have – across generations – a demographic advantage. And, in terms of cultural evolution, those cultures which emphasize triadic families of father-&-mother-&-children are positioned to systematically displace and/or to replace those cultures which emphasize the mother-&-children dyadic family.

Key Words: Cultural evolution, gender roles, father-child relations, divorce, single-parent births

Rule #1: All Politics are local.
Rep. Tip O'Neill
Rule #2: All long-term politics are reproductive strategies.
Rule #3: All effective long term politics camouflage Rule #2.
Ipsoc Macquire

The generalized imagery of the (U.S.) father figure has become something of a kaleidoscope which has been repeatedly turned by academics and the literati within the last quarter century. (See Demos [1986], Griswold [1993], LaRossa [1997], LaRossa et al. [1991], Nash [1965, 1976] for historical perspectives on the U.S. father).

Until very recently – the latter part of the 20th century – the social father was a given in virtually any and all societies (Hendrix, 1996, Hewlett 1992; Lamb, 1987, Mackey, 1996; Malinowski, 1927;

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Van den Berghe, 1979). Two very distinct, antinomous interpretations of this given are available in relationship to the value or function of the current generation of fathers within the U.S. and within any other society with an industrialized-service oriented economy. First, it can be argued that prior fathers had served the dual roles of protector & provider which were essential to the survival of their wives as well as their children. However, current governmental protectors, viz. local police, state police, the national guard, and the nation's armed forces, have efficiently and successfully undertaken the role of protector. The husband/father, who is less well trained for this role, is not needed. Similarly, governmental agencies, through local, state, and federal programs, have made death from privation and malnutrition extremely unlikely. Hence, the father's role of provider can also be supplanted either by working mothers and/or by governmental agencies. The argument would finish with the conclusion that social fathers in an industrialized, service-oriented, information based economy represent an anachronism and are best understood as being somewhere between supernumerary or optional. On the other hand, the second interpretation argues that the sheer omnipresence of social fathers strongly infers important functions of fatherhood that transcend differences in economies, religions, political structures, ecologies or diets.

This article takes the second position and argues that, across generations, biocultural dynamics lend an inherent advantage to those cultures which adhere men/fathers to the mother-child dyad and lend an inherent disadvantage to those cultures which systematically abrade men from the status-role complex of the social father. Framed a little differently, it is argued that those cultures which more keep the nuclear family intact will have a more promising trajectory across generations than will those cultures whose expectations view the social father as either supernumerary or optional. It should be made clear that the focus of this inquiry is upon biocultural viability, across generations, and not upon cultural desirability nor upon appropriate versus inappropriate lifestyles.

Cultural Evolution and Biocultural Extinction

Although each and every individual on this planet is guaranteed mortality, some cultures - intact social groups - transcend individual mortality and last innumerable generations. However, all cultures are

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not so blessed, and the ethnographic literature is replete with examples of cultures which are simply no more. They are gone and gone forever. Some such cultures have been mighty – Caesar's Rome, the Maya, and the Aztecs. Others have been more modest – the Ona, the Yahgan, the Tasmanian. The problem explored by this article is to tease out any relationships between the role of the social father in a culture and the level of that culture's perpetuity or long term survival. There are two major routes to fatherlessness which will be analyzed in this context: father abrasion (divorce) and father preclusion (single parent births).[1]

The key element to cultural continuity is "births". If births consistently outnumber deaths in a culture, then that culture will expand. If deaths consistently outnumber births, then that culture will be threatened with extinction, e.g. the Shakers who practiced celibacy. If births and deaths are essentially equal, then the population remains in numerical stasis.

The primary demographic index to be used here is the rate of natural increase (birth rates minus death rates). With close to the power of a definition, those cultures with consistently higher rates of natural increase will represent, over generations, proportionately larger segments of the referent population than those competing cultures which have persistently lower rates of natural increase. If the rates of natural increase should prove to be negative for a culture, then that culture is threatened with extinction. The extinction would be slower with a slightly negative index and faster with a larger negative index.

Divorce and Rates of Natural Increase

Divorce rates (number of divorces per 1000 population) from the United Nations and the annual percentage of natural increase were available by nation (United Nations, 1990, 1995; UNESCO, 1994). The data indicate that divorce rates are (negatively) related to the annual percent of natural increase. The correlation is fairly robust (r_p = -.414; p <.001 n = 93 nations). Approximately 17% ($.414^2$ = .171 = 17.1%) of the differences in percentage of natural increase

[1] Minor sources of chronic separations of children from their fathers include jail, military duty, and widowhood (which was formerly the major source of fatherlessness).

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

* p < .05 (one-tailed); ** p < .05 (two-tailed); *** p < .001

R = .441; p < .001; n = 83; (adjusted) R^2 = .195

FIGURE 1. Relationships among the four independent variables and divorce rates

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can be attributed to differences in divorce rates. Framed a little differently, as divorce rates become higher, rates of natural increase become lower, and, given the coarseness of using a nation as a unit of analysis with the increased risks of false negatives, the shifts are somewhat substantial.

Of course, neither divorce rates nor levels of natural increase occur in isolation, and additional variables would need to be assayed to flesh out a context. The following model was developed to give the divorce-&-natural increase relationship just such a context. The following data were gleaned from information provided by the United Nations (United Nations, 1990, 1995; UNESCO, 1994) and the CIA (*Worldmark Encyclopedia of Nations* 1995).

A number of authors have noted that, when a country develops a cash economy, workers are needed to man stores, factories, and businesses. If women are allowed access to those newly created jobs, they quickly integrate themselves into the paid labor force. For discussion and examples, see Bulatao, et al. (1983), Caldwell (1982), Day & Mackey (1986), Easterlin & Crimmins (1985), Fawcett (1983), Handwerker (1986), cf. Aghajanian (1977, 1988), Bradley (1984), Nag, White & Peet (1978), Ross & Harris (1987). In turn, formalized schooling is needed to train those workers in literacy and ciphering, Thus, the model would suggest that as an expanding cash economy (indexed by the gross domestic product's per capita income or GDP) gains momentum in a country, then (i) the percentage of the labor force engaged in subsistence agriculture would drop, (ii) birth rates would drop (and, as a consequence, rates of natural increase would drop [as long as death rates do not increase]), and (iii) the percentage of all students in tertiary education (beyond high school/secondary education) who were females would also increase. As Figure 1 illustrates, such is the case. (Note that all indices were not available for all countries, – hence the "n" varies per index).

Furthermore, as subsistence agriculture lessens in importance, divorce rates increase (r_p = -.225 p <.05; one-tailed, n = 91). As the percentage of female students, compared to male students, in institutions of tertiary education increases, divorce rates also increase (r_p = .266; p <.05; two-tailed, n = 73). The combined effect upon divorce rates of the three variables (natural increase, percentage female tertiary students, and the percentage of the labor force in agriculture) was significant (R = .441; p < .001; n = 83) and

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accounted for approximately 20% (R^2 [adjusted] = 19.5%) of the variance in divorce rates. See Figure 1. (Of interest, GDP per capita income itself is not significantly related to divorce rates [r_p = .201; .1 > p > .05; n = 91]). See Appendix I for additional combinations of multivariate correlation coefficients.

From these data, the following argument is made. When women, within their own socio-cultural milieu, can expand their status-role complexes beyond that of motherhood, they will do so. If the women can enter into the paid labor force and earn a salary, they will do so. If any formal training beyond the secondary level (high school) facilitates or enhances the women's marketability in the labor force, the women will increase their attendance in the appropriate institutions of higher learning. If alternative status-role complexes, other than motherhood, are adopted by women, then the number of births per woman decreases. Birth rates drop, and the annual percentage of natural increase also drops. If the traditional male role of breadwinner can now be performed by the woman herself or by the government, then the husband/father, if he proves unsatisfactory to the woman, can be jettisoned by divorce (if divorce is allowable in the country in question and if she is preemptively given child custody). It may be noted in passing that a cross-cultural analysis of divorce reveals that a failure to provide support or resources (food, clothing, & shelter) to the wife/mother by the husband/father was a socially sanctioned reason to divorce in 23 cultures. In none of these 23 was a similar failure toward the husband/father by the wife/mother a socially sanctioned reason to cause a divorce to occur (Betzig, 1989).

Europe versus the Moslem Swathe

Let's take two polar sub-samples and carry out the analysis just with the two subsamples. The two sub-samples are Europe (n = 40 countries) and a swathe of countries wherein Islam is the dominant religion starting from Mauritania and running eastward to Pakistan (n = 25 countries). These sub-samples abut each other around the Mediterranean Sea – the Moslem swathe to the south and Europe to the north. Any genetic differences of these peoples is probably minimal, but the cultural differences are manifest.

For example, the Moslem swathe – compared to the European nations – had (i) a higher level of natural increase, (ii) a lower GDP per capita income, (iii) a higher percentage of the labor force

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TABLE 1.

Highest (top 10) and lowest (bottom 10) fertility rates (mean number of children per woman) by country and geographical area (Smith-Morris, 1990; United Nations, 1990).

Highest fertility:				Lowest fertility:			
Rank	Country	Fertility	Area	Rank	Country	Fertility	Area
1	Rwanda	8.29	Africa	1	West Germany	1.38	Europe
2	Kenya	8.12	Africa	2	Denmark	1.45	Europe
3	Cote d'Ivoire	7.41	Africa		Netherlands	1.45	Europe
4	Zambia	7.20	Africa		Italy	1.45	Europe
5	Oman	7.17	Asia		Luxembourg	1.45	Europe
	Saudi Arabia	7.17	Asia	6	Austria	1.50	Europe
				7	Switzerland	1.55	Europe
	Jordan	7.17	Asia		Belgium	1.55	Europe
8	Niger	7.10	Africa	9	Finland	1.65	Europe
	Tanzania	7.10	Africa		Sweden	1.65	Europe
10	Nigeria	7.00	Africa				
Mean		7.37				1.51	
s		0.45				0.09	

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engaged in agriculture, and (iv) a lower percentage of female (rather than male) students enrolled in institutions of tertiary education. See Table 1.

It seems self-evident that those biocultural formulae which consistently generate higher levels of natural increase will displace or replace those biocultural formulae with lower levels of natural increase. Given that the current Moslem swathe formula has an inherent and robust advantage over the Europe formula, the expectation would be that – across generations – the Moslem swathe formula is positioned to displace or to replace that found in Europe. It may be noted here that the fertility level of virtually all the countries of Europe is below replacement level (2100 births per 1000 women).

The Drive-Wheel

The argument presented here argues that, for both the overall sample and the two sub-samples of Europe and the Moslem swathe, the key variable is the amount of latitude that women have in sculpting their own life-style trajectories. If women are more restricted to the mother status-role complex, birth rates tend to be higher. If women have greater options beyond the mother status-role complex, then birth rates will be attenuated. Thus, if a cash economy is established, wherein formal training is a pre-condition for employment, then women, if not proscribed by law or tradition, will enter that economy. To the extent that a woman's position as employee or entrepreneur conflicts with motherhood, the greater the pressures for her to reduce the number of children she will conceive, bear, and raise.

Independence and Divorce

Not only does employment within a cash economy enhance the woman's financial freedom, but the data suggest that its consequences offer her an extra ply of conjugal freedom. That is, if she is not accruing sufficient satisfaction with her current marital situation, then she has the added opportunity to dissolve her union and to re-direct her life's trajectory in a direction that is more aligned with her wishes. Divorce statistics from the U.S. (Chadwick & Heaton 1992, Fox & Kelly 1995, Mackey 1993, National Center for Health Statistics 1989, Sack 1987, Sitarz 1990), Great Britain (Buckle, Gallup, & Rodd 1996,

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Dennis 1992), Canada (Peters 1979), New Zealand (Sullivan & Allen 1996), and China (Beijing Review 1995, Hong & Ning 1992) suggest that, (i) if divorce can be efficiently initiated by the woman (ii) during her child-bearing years, and (iii) the mother nominally retains custody of the minor children, then petitioners for divorce are dominated by the wives rather than by the husbands. Divorce and cultural evolution

Thus, within the short term – i.e. within a single generation - as life-style options are increased for women, (i) divorce increases and (ii) the rate of natural increase is lowered. Consequently, across generations, an interesting dynamic would occur. Namely, those cultures with more expanded options for women would be under systematic pressures to be displaced or replaced by cultures which constricted women's life-time experiences toward those of motherhood.

For example, the countries of the Moslem swathe are generally considered to be highly patriarchal with women precluded from positions of economic or political power and from a wide spectrum of occupations. Authors, including feminist ideologues, who have written ethnographic accounts of the relevant Moslem countries invariably refer to the strongly patriarchal character of the political and economic structures. The question is never "*IS* the country patriarchal?" The ethnographic accounts revolve around how the patriarchy developed and how is it maintained. For example, Ahmed (1992) writes "The subordination of women in the ancient Middle East appears to have become institutionalized with the rise of urban societies and with the rise of the archaic state in particular..." and, as Islam crystallized its theology, "Implicit in this new order was the male right to control women and to interdict their interactions with other men. Thus the ground was prepared for the closures that would follow." See Kadioglu (1994) for a parallel argument for women's role in Turkey. Toubia (1988, pp. 2-3) makes the case quite clearly: "Arab women are dominated by men in every area of life in the patriarchal family system: state, political party, trade union and public and private institutions of all types." She notes that over 97% (97.2%) of the Yemeni women, as late as 1975, were illiterate. Badran (1995, p. 5) notes that "the woman was perceived as essentially or exclusively, a sexual being, unlike the man who was only partly understood in terms of his sexuality". Gerami (1996, p. 157) views the current version of Islamic fundamentalism as "...nipping a very young feminist

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movement in the bud and under the banner of nature's mandate, pushed women further into the family. They managed to cast woman's individualistic identity as a perversion of her nature plotted by Western imperialists". Obermeyer (1995, p. 370) observes that the "Islamic emphasis on complementarity rather than equality in gender roles" makes dialogue with a worldview predicated on equality rather than complementarity extremely difficult. Inhorn writes that: "in a society (Egypt) where the patriarchal fertility mandate is emphatic, the social and psychological consequences of 'missing motherhood' - of being a woman unable to deliver a child for her husband, family, affines, community, faith, nation, and not inconsequentially her - are nothing if not profound". It is germane to this argument that, in general, Moslem men can initiate divorce far more easily than the Moslem women. The Koran gives some theological basis for this asymmetry, and local interpretations have intensified the gender differences (Ansari 1973, Hekmat 1997, Kamali 1984). For reviews of the literature, see A[-Qazzaz (1977), Meghdessian, (1980), Mernisse (1991), Raccagni (1978), and Tucker (1993). For theoretical overviews, see Lerner (1986) and Walby (1990).

A survey of women legislators found that women in the 14 Moslem nations, which were included in the survey, averaged less than 4% (3.2%, s.d. = 3.5%) of the legislators. This figure is contrasted to the average of women legislators of 17.0% (s.d. = 10.9%) in the European nations [$t = 20.738$; $p < .001$; $df = 37$] (Nelson & Chowdbury 1994, Sivard 1995).

These Moslem countries have a rate of natural increase (mean = 3.0% per year) over seven times that of the European countries (mean = 0.4% per year). And it is the European countries which, in the main, have been in the forefront of advocating gender egalitarianism. Hence, compared to those of Europe, the bio-cultural packages representing the countries in the Moslem swathe will increase their proportion of the area's population in each of the succeeding generations during which the disparity persists. Framed a little differently, not only will comparatively more children be born within the confines of the Moslem swathe, but their worldview and their mores & folkways which eventuated in their increased proportions will similarly be increased within the area's cultures. Specifically and ironically, the social constriction of women's roles to that of motherhood will be expanded demographically.

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On the other side of the coin, compared to those of the Moslem swathe, the biocultural packages representing the countries of Europe will decrease their proportion of the area's population in each of the succeeding generation during which the disparity persists. That is, the extremely low fertility levels will result in European children representing an ever smaller proportion of the area's children. And the cultural value of gender egalitarianism - which helped to facilitate the lowered fertility levels - will be shared by a perpetually shrinking proportion of the countries in the Circum-Mediterranean region. The demographic advantage which is currently being accrued to the Moslem swathe would be shared with any other cultures around the world which parallel the Moslem swathe's delineation of women's roles. The demographic disadvantage accrued to the European nations would also be shared with any other groups around the world which parallel the European cultural mosaic.

Emigration and Immigration

In an example of cultural diffusion, emigrants tend to flow from high fertility, lower income areas to low fertility, higher income areas. In the context of this article, emigrants from the Moslem swathe tend to gravitate toward (Western) European nations. When they enter and settle into their new homeland, they, of course, bring with them the world-views, expectations, and traditions which had successfully led to their own socialization. This cultural package includes an anticipation of relatively high fertility. For example, Turkish immigrants into Austria average 4.43 children per woman. This figure is more than twice the figure for Austrian nationals (1.64 children per woman). Moroccan immigrants into Belgium average 5.7 children and Turkish women average 5.0 children. Both of these averages are more than three times the mean number of children per Belgium nationals (1.6). Pakistan immigrants into Great Britain average 5.3 children per woman. This figure is more than triple the figure for Great Britain's average of 1.7. French nationals average 1.82 children per woman which is less than half of immigrants from Algeria (4.24), Morocco (4.47), Tunisia (4.67), and Turkey (4.55). German woman average about 1.3 children each whereas Turkish immigrants average more than twice that number (2.9 children). Dutch women average 1.6 children, but Turkish women who emigrate to the Netherlands average 3.1 children and Moroccan emigrants average 4.7 children.

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Finally, Swedish women average 2.1 children, but Turkish emigrants average 3.45 children (Coleman, 1994). See White (1997) and see Morris (1997) for discussion. Thus, each of the two demographic profiles (Europe and the Moslem swathe) is not isolated from the other, but illustrate a dynamic wherein cultural mosaics with higher fertility will displace or replace cultural mosaics with lower fertility.

The German example is illustrative here. From 1960 to 1990, the proportion of births in which at least one of the parents was non-German increased eightfold (from 2% to 16.9%) (Statistisches Bundesamt, 1992).[2] In addition, when fertility rates, as measured by children ever born (live) per thousand women, are used as the index, a similar picture emerges. In 1970, the fertility rate was 2010 lifetime births per 1000 German women and 2176 for non-German women. That is, the rate was about 8% higher for non-German women. By 1990, the rate for German women dropped to 1420 lifetime births. The rate for non-German women had dropped to 1900 lifetime births; yet was nearly a third higher than that of German women (Statistisches Bundesamt, 1992). Thus, even though native Germans are reproducing below replacement value, the land is not becoming empty, non-Germans are more than willing and able to move and to take up the slack. (See Coleman [1994] for similar examples from other European countries and see Morris (1997) for further examples and analysis). In terms of overall population growth in Germany, a hefty 128% of Germany's growth is due to immigration (Martin & Widgren, 1996).

Conversely, European migration to the Moslem swathe is meager to non-existent. Therefore, demographic, empirical evidence does become available to illustrate the trajectory of cultural evolution. The cultural mosaic of the father-&- mother-&-child(ren) triadic

[2] In 1960, 92.50% of the births in Germany were of German parents (another 6.3% of the children were born to single mother Germans). Two percent of the children were born to parents involving at least one non-German (0.1%, a German father & a non-German mother, 0.7% a German mother & a non-German father, and 1.2% to non-German mothers [either a single parent or with a non-German father]). By 1990, the percentage of births to two German parents dropped to 73.5% (another 9.5% were born to single German mothers). By 1990, the percentage of births involving at least one non-German rose to 1.69% (2.2% a German father & a non-German mother, 2.8% a German mother & a non-German father, and 11.9% to non-German mothers [either a single parent birth or with a non-German father]) (*Statistisches Bundesamt* 1992).

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family – with the women restricted to the status-role complex of motherhood – is structured to systematically replace or displace a cultural mosaic wherein the father is optional or supernumerary and gender egalitarianism is extant.

Two U.S. Examples

Shifting the focus from the Circum-Mediterranean region to the U.S., two examples from the U.S. help make a similar analytical point that expanded woman's roles and fertility operate at loggerheads. The first example is from a highly profiled, if more rarefied, sample with all the attendant problems in such sampling. The second sample is less stark, but has more generalizability.

Men and Women from Who's Who

The inclusion of an individual in *Who's Who* (*Who's Who*, 1997) generally reflects a consistent level of high achievement on the part of that individual.[3] Accordingly, a sample of men who were listed in *Who's Who* was surveyed by number of children they (and their wife or wives) had reared. A second sample was surveyed of women who were listed in WW by the number of children they (and their husband or husbands) had reared. The first 25 names of men and the first 25 names of women were surveyed for each letter of the alphabet (with the exception of "X". The individuals in the U.S. with a surname beginning with "X" are either rare or underachieving). A total of 628 men were surveyed. A total of 630 women were surveyed. The results are presented below.

Men in Who's Who The mean number of children per man in WW was 2.156 (s.d. 1.548). The mean number of children per father (n = 504) was 2.687 (s.d. = 1.205). Nearly 20% (19.7%) of the men were childless.

Women in Who's Who

The mean number of children per woman in Who's Who was 1.254 (s.d. = 1.374). This figure was less than the similar figure for men (t [2144] = 10.920.) p <.001). The mean number of children per

[3] *Who's Who*, in the main, represents achieved status vis-a-vis *The Social Register* which, in the main, represents the ascribed status of the entries' families.

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mother (n = 362) was 2.180 (s.d. = 1.154) and was lower than the mean number of children per father (t = 6.252 [2142], p <.001). Over 40% (42.5%) of the women were childless. This number was higher than that of the men's (z = 8.733; p <.001). The mean age of women in Who's Who was in excess of 50 years; thereby indicating that their child-bearing was essentially completed.

Synopsis of Who's Who Data

Thus, not only were (all) women in Who's Who below the replacement value of 2100 children per 1000 women, they were also below the (all) men's level. Given the very high level of childlessness in the women's Who's Who, these results are not unexpected. However, when the fertility level of (only) mothers is compared to that of (only) fathers, the mothers in Who's Who - although above replacement level - were still substantially below that of fathers. Therefore, women in Who's Who who did become mothers were still yielding a fertility rate below that of women-&-mothers who married men in Who's Who. Framed a little differently, high achieving women are operating at a lower fertility level than are high achieving men, i.e. a matrilineage of high achieving women would be extremely difficult to maintain in the current U.S.

Fertility and Education

As has been well documented in numerous outlets, there is an inverse relationship in the U.S. between level of formal education and fertility and this inverse relationship is neither new nor unique.[4] Of special interest here is the gap between being a high school graduate (a status which most U.S. women attain) and those women who attend at least one year of graduate school (a status only a minority of women would attain). The high school graduates have approximately twice the number of actualized births and a comparable number of potential or expected births in the future. See Table 2. Even if all the planned births of the female graduate students occurred, their fertility rate would still be well below replacement value. See Table 2. See Smock (1981) for similar data from addit-

[4] Because of low death rates across all the educational levels, fertility rates can be effectively, if not identically, equated with rates of natural increase.

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TABLE 2.

Birth expectations of women by educational attainment in 1982 (from Bianchi & Spain 1986) and 1992 (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1995).

Year/Age and years of School completed	Births to date	Percentage expecting no births
1982		
Total, Ages 18 - 34 years	1.1	11.6%
Not high school graduate	1.7	8.7%
High school, 4 years	1.2	10.3%
College, 1 to 3 years	0.8	13.1%
College, 4 years	0.6	15.7%
College, 5 years or more	0.6	18.7%
1992		
Total, Ages 18 - 34 years	1.1	9.3%
Not a high school graduate	1.8	7.6%
High school, 4 years	1.3	9.0%
College, 1 to 3 years	0.8	10.0%
College, 4 years	0.7	10.3%
College, 5 years or more	0.6	12.0%

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ional countries.

Synopsis

Thus, from both U.S. samples, the same interpretation becomes available: as high achieving women expand their options beyond the mother status-role complex, their fertility rates fall and fall below replacement value. No intact group can sustain itself if its rate of natural increase is negative. This pattern parallels the European pattern. To wit: when options are increased for women, the women avail themselves of those enhanced options and, to the extent that alternative roles are incompatible with that of the multiparous mother, birth rates drop (see Brown [1970] and Murdock & Provost [1973] for cross-cultural examples and discussion).

Furthermore, based on the European model, U.S. divorce rates would be expected to be higher than the world's sample, and such is the case. The mean for the world's sample (n = 93) of divorce rates was 1.58 (s.d. = 1.23), the U.S. divorce rates was 4.75: over double the world's average. In addition, U.S. mothers - rather than fathers - (i) dominate the petitioning for divorce (see Table 3) and (ii) tend to retain custody (both *de jure* and *de facto* of minor children (Chadwick & Heaton 1992, Fox & Kelly 1995, Mackey 1993, National Center for Health Statistics 1989; Sack 1987, Sitarz 1990).

DISCUSSION

The thesis being argued here is that cultures which keep the nuclear family intact have a long term advantage when compared to those cultures which allow the biological/social father to be abraded or jettisoned at the discretion of the wife/mother. The prototypic comparison is between the countries of Europe and those of the Moslem swathe. Europe has high divorce and high independence of its women and a very low birth rate. Again, the fertility rate of virtually all of contemporary Europe is below replacement value. As a matter of contrast, the Moslem swathe is intensely patriarchal, with low independence for its women and has a comparatively high fertility rate. The bio-cultural packages found in Europe are under systematic pressures to be displaced or replaced by those bio-cultural packages found in the Moslem swathe. And, indeed, as numerous authors have pointed out, migration from the Moslem swathe into Europe is real

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TABLE 3.

Percentage of divorces by number of children and by status of petitioner: 1982-1986 (Mean number of divorces = 573,931)(National Center for Health Statistics 1989, 1996).

Number of children	Status of petitioner: Husband	Wife	Other	Total	Ratio of Wife to husband	Status of petitioner: Husband	Wife
None	35.5%	55.9%	8.6%	100.0%	1.6	52.6%	42.7%
sd	0.3%	0.9%	0.6%			0.9%	0.1%
One	27.8%	64.8%	7.4%	100.0%	2.3	22.7%	27.3%
sd	0.5%	1.0%	0.5%			0.2%	0.1%
Two	27.6%	64.7%	7.7%	100.0%	2.3	17.5%	21.1%
sd	0.7%	0.7%	0.6%			0.4%	0.9%
Three or more	27.4%	65.7%	7.9%	100.0%	2.4	7.2%	8.9%
sd	0.7%	0.8%	0.6%			0.3%	0.3%
All numbers	31.3%	60.2%	8.5%	100.0%	1.9	100.0%	100.0%
sd	0.4%	0.8%	0.5%				

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and substantial. Once these immigrants have ensconced themselves within their new homelands, they tend to maintain a higher birth rate than that of the native European inhabitants (Coleman, 1994). Accordingly, two forces acting upon the Moslem immigrants are in play: the inertia of cultural diffusion versus cultural assimilation. The relative potency of each force in determining the immigrants' rates of natural increase is an interesting dynamic to follow across generations.

Out-of-Wedlock Births and Rates of Natural Increase

Whereas rates of divorce (father removal) lend themselves to a patterned integration into larger cultural contexts, rates of out-of-wedlock births (father preclusion) are more elusive in understanding how they meld into an overall cultural mosaic. Part of the dilemma is the restricted number of countries which record or make public such data. Such information was available from only 52 countries, and approximately half (n = 24) of these were from Europe. Nonetheless, when this truncated sub-sample of 52 is analyzed, no relationship is found between percentage of out-of-wedlock births (percentage of all live births which were out-of-wedlock),[5] and (i) divorce rates, (ii) GDP per capita income, (iii) percentage of the labor force engaged in agriculture, and (iv) the percentage of tertiary students who were female. A tenuous relationship was found between percentage of out-of-wedlock births and rate of natural increase (r_p = .281; p <.05, one tailed; n = 52), and this relationship was positive, rather than the expected negative. The relationship between rates of divorce and percentage of out-of-wedlock births resoundingly reflected independence (r_p = .004, n.s.; n = 47). When the combined impact of the four independent variables (GDP, percentage of labor force in agriculture, rate of natural increase, and percentage of female tertiary students) upon the dependent variable (percentage of out-of-wedlock births) is analyzed, the results indicate independence (R =.373; p > .15; n = 47).

[5] The United Nations defines "illegitimacy" in the following manner: "Legitimate refers to persons born of parents who were married at the time of birth in accordance with the laws of the country or area. Illegitimate refers to children of parents, who, according to national law, were not married at the time of birth, regardless of whether these children have been recognized or legitimized after birth." (United Nations, 1992).

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However, when the analysis was focused only upon the European nations (n = 24), a more coherent pattern emerged. Rates of divorce and percentage of out-of-wedlock births were marginally related ($r_p < .05$; one-tailed). And when the other four births were used in concert, their relationship with the percentage of out-of-wedlock births was significant (R = .811; p < .001; n = 24). Over half (R^2 [adjusted] = .585 = 58.5%) of the variance in the percentage of out-of-wedlock births could be accounted for by the four variables. If divorce rates are included as a fifth independent variable, then, for the nations which had data for all the indices, the correlation coefficient (R) is essentially unchanged (R = .812; p < .01 - 2-tailed, n = 22) with over half (R^2 [adjusted] = .553 = 55.3%) of the variance in percentage of out-of wedlock births accounted for.

Again, keeping the frame of reference only to Europe, the interpretation of the genesis of increasing percentages of out-of-wedlock births (father preclusion) parallels that of divorce (father abrasion). As women have fewer children, and either the government or their own initiatives can generate resources for themselves and their child(ren), the women simply by-pass the role of social father as they enter into motherhood.

The lack of consonance between Europe and the other nations which had statistics on illegitimacy is intriguing. Europe could be a harbinger of trends which would be paralleled by other nations as they increase opportunities for women and switch from a more agrarian economy to one more oriented toward service & manufacturing. On the other hand, Europe may simply prove to be a unique cultural amalgam of ecology and history, and its cultural pathways would offer no predictability when applied to alternative cultures. Additional data from non-European nations plus an extended time horizon will help answer the query.

Conclusion

It seems to be a logical imperative that those intact groups with greater rates of natural increase – the gap between birth rates and death rates – will systematically replace or displace those intact groups with lesser rates of natural increase. The replacement or displacement would be slower if the differential gap is small and would be quicker if the differential gap is large. In either case, as long as one rate of natural increase remains larger than an alternative

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rate, the group with the larger rate has a demographic advantage in terms of cultural evolution. Even though each current citizen of the planet is guaranteed to have ancestors, no one citizen is similarly guaranteed to have descendants. Those biocultural packages which comprise and define each intact social group must have histories, but are not similarly guaranteed perpetual futures.

The cross-cultural data suggest that two facets of a cultural mosaic have more staying power when compared to alternatives. First, cultures which restrict women's roles to motherhood tend to have higher levels of natural increase than do cultures which expand women's roles over and beyond that of motherhood. Second, cultures which adhere biological & social fathers to the mother-child dyad also have a demographic advantage when compared to cultures which positively sanction divorce and/or out-of-wedlock births. The comparison of European countries with those of a Moslem swathe clearly profiles the dynamics of how a cultural formula which emphasizes (i) expanded women's roles and (ii) problematic fatherhood is at a clear demographic disadvantage when compared to a cultural formula which (i) constricts women's roles to that of motherhood and (ii) has on-going fatherhood as a given.

Thus, without commenting upon desirability, the gains of women in the occupational, political, and economic spheres appear to be short-lived. And that, unless a new social contract is forged, a patriarchal form of cultural organization – forged around the traditional nuclear family – will remain predominant.

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APPENDIX I.

Additional relationships among the four independent variables (Gross domestic product per capita income, percentage of tertiary students who are female, annual percentage of natural increase, and percentage of the labor force which is engaged in agriculture)and the dependent variable (divorce rates).

Combination of independent variables /(n)	Dependent variable	R
(Percentage of women in tertiary education) x (% natural increase)/ (n = 85)	Divorce rates	.451 **
(Per capita GDP) x (% natural increase)/ (n = 91)	Divorce rates	.407 **
(Percentage of labor force in agriculture) x (% natural increase)/ (n = 91)	Divorce rates	.423 **
(Percentage of women in tertiary education) x (Per capita GDP) x (Percentage of labor force in agriculture) x (% natural increase)/ (n = 82)	Divorce rates	.445 *

* $p < .01$; 2-tailed; ** $p < .001$.

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Man
Between Past and Future

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University of Florence, Italy

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Migration as an Economic and Political Weapon

J. W. Jamieson
Washington D.C.

In light of the ongoing Third World population explosion, there is a growing likelihood that emigration from the more overcrowded countries of the Third World to the more prosperous – albeit often equally-overcrowded – countries of the developed world will be encouraged by governments seeking to alleviate economic woes arising from inordinately high fecundity.

Key Words: Migration, world population explosion, globalization,Third World, Malthus, World Bank, World Health Organization

In the year 1890, the British geographer Ernest George Ravenstein gave a lecture in Leeds, England, which was published shortly thereafter in the Proceedings of the Royal Geographical Society of Great Britain and Ireland. He made remarkably accurate calculations as to the possible increase in the world's population over the next sixty years, and warned, in Malthusian style, that despite possible scientific improvements in food production, a time would come when the earth could no longer support the vast numbers of people being born each day.

Early Demographic Projections

Thus, according to Ravenstein, the world population would increase from some 1.75 billion in 1890, to 2.3 billion in 1950. In this he was very close to the mark, as the actual 1950 figure was around 2.5 billion; but thereafter his estimates fell hopelessly short. Ravenstein could not conceive of the impact that modern medicine and the World Health Organization would have on the child mortality rate in the tropical and semi-tropical regions of the world – a drastic lowering of the death rate which unleashed the contemporary explosion in the population of the Third World. From the earliest of times, the high birth rate of mankind in pre-industrial societies had been balanced by a high infant mortality rate, but since 1950 the world population has increased from 2.5 billion, to 4 billion in 1976, and to 6 billion in late 1999. It is expected to be 8.5 billion by 2025. The World Bank believes it will eventually stabilize at between 10 and

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11 billion, while some demographers put the estimate as high as 14.5 billion.[1] At present, due to scientific improvements in food production, the only reason for starvation is the sheer cost of moving masses of food to the locations in which that food is needed. But over-population is nevertheless causing a rapid depletion of the natural resources of the earth, with the rapid disappearance of rain forests and the widespread erosion of top soil throughout the areas of prime over-population.

While the indigenous peoples of Europe – and the peoples of European descent in North America and other areas of overseas settlement – are either barely replacing themselves or in many cases failing to maintain their existing levels of population, the Third World population explosion continues. The figures are well-known. Each generation (estimated at a 30 year time-span), the overall population of the world is increasing by close to 3 billion people. That is to say, it is increasing every thirty years by more than the total world population of 1890. Some 42 countries have an annual population growth rate in excess of 3%, which means they double their population every 25 years). Twenty-four of these are located in Africa, and ten of the remaining 20 are in the Middle East.

Contemporary Demographic Figures

With the news media celebrating the birth of the six billionth member of the contemporary human population, the more cautious demographers see no hope of an actual reversal of the trend in the foreseeable future. Although the *rate* of increase has declined in the East Asian countries, population is still increasing; and in South Asia, Africa and Latin America it is still increasing rapidly. The population of Africa was half of Europe's in 1950, but became equal to it, at 480 million each, by 1985. It is expected to be three times larger by 2025: 1.58 billion people in Africa compared to Europe's 512 million.[2] The

[1] Paul Kennedy, *Preparing for the Twenty-First Century* (New York: Random House, 1993), pp. 22, 23, 12; *Wichita Eagle*, November 12, 1996, Knight-Ridder News Service Report by Rick Nichols; Carl Sagan, "Science and Technology in the 20th Century," *New Perspectives Quarterly*, Summer 1996, p. 51.

[2] Kennedy, *Preparing for the Twenty-First Century*, p. 24.

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population of Kenya doubles every 17 years.[3] Sub-Saharan Africa's population is growing 2.8 percent per year, doubling every 25 years, compared to 1.2 percent and every 58 years for the United States.[4] Outside Africa, a similar pattern prevails: Mexico's population, for example, was only 34 million in 1960, but grew to 72 million by 1980.[5] China's population in 1993 of 1.13 billion went to 1.22 billion by 1997, and is expected to increase to 1.5 billion by 2025.[6] India's growth is much faster than China's Paul Kennedy says that India, which has a billion people today, will match China's population by 2025 – an estimated 1.5 billion.[7]

The World Bank believes that world population will eventually stabilize at between 10 and 11 billion, while some demographers put the estimate as high as 14.5 billion.[8] But all these estimates are based on a belief that the birthrate will decline as standards of living rise, and there is no proof that what happened in the developed countries will happen to populations with fundamentally different cultures. Much more certainly, there is little evidence that in regions such as Africa economic growth is likely to outpace population growth and bring the anticipated prosperity on which these optimistic estimates rely.

What is more, there is no reason to believe that the world's population will cease to grow rapidly. The average age of the population of the Third World is young, and the number of young men and women of reproductive age who are producing children is greater than ever before. Many areas, such as the Caribbean and, more importantly, South Asia, just cannot hold more people without an impossibly massive economic investment to provide the economic

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[3] James K. Patterson, "The Liberal Answer to World Over-Population: The Advanced Nations Should Stop Reproducing!," *Conservative Review*, October 1991, p. 6.

[4] N. Gregory Mankiw, *Commentary,* 1992 Jackson Hole Federal Reserve Symposium on "Policies for Long-Run Economic Growth," p. 92.

[5] Palmer Stacy, "The Great Betrayal: U. S. Immigration Policy, 1965-1993," Special Report, American Immigration Control Foundation, 1993, p. 8.

[6] Kennedy, *Preparing for the Twenty-First Century*, p. 25; *Wichita Eagle*, August 24, 1997, report.

[7] Kennedy, *Preparing for the Twenty-First Century*, p. 25.

[8] Paul Kennedy, *Preparing for the Twenty-First Century* (New York: Random House, 1993), pp. 22, 23, 12; Carl Sagan, "Science and Technology in the 20th Century," *New Perspectives Quarterly*, Summer 1996, p. 51.

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system that a larger population would require, but the population of those areas goes on expanding, forcing increasingly massive outward migration into less impoverished countries. And even after entering such countries, the birth rate amongst the immigrants does not always fall to the level of the Western world – cultural factors may be the reason for this.

Rising Global Migration

As a result of the Third World population explosion, North America and Europe are receiving increasing numbers of both legal and illegal immigrants. While many may believe that the more prosperous nations of the West can afford to take in these immigrants, what they so often forget is that the ecology of the West is already being damaged by the weight of the population that it is required to carry. Yet immigration is sure to increase, unless rigidly checked by the receiving countries, until the receiving countries resemble the lands from which the immigrants are fleeing.

In Britain, a diminutive group of islands surrounded by water and blessed by ample rainfall, there is now a threat of water shortage, as the population rises annually due to further immigration into these overcrowded isles. Underground aquifers, created in the Ice Ages, are being steadily drained down, and as more of the land surface is covered by houses and roads the rainwater rapidly drains off into the ocean instead of soaking into the ground. Consequently the government is obliged to invest even more each year in the construction of dams, obliterating farmland and rural valleys that once provided places of retreat from the ever-growing urban areas. Once renowned for its natural beauty, Britain today finds its residents flocking to spend their holidays on the continent, so dismal has their own country become – with broad stretches of open countryside having already become a very rare commodity in the south.

As signatories to the U.N. conventions and the Treaty of Rome, none of the European countries are permitted to refuse immigrants 'seeking freedom from political oppression.' It is impossible to effectively define what conditions make a person a political refugee, let alone efficiently investigate the multitudes of applications made by economic migrants who seek admission by claiming political asylum; and many of the African and other Third World governments are truly despotic by Western standards. Indeed, if claims for political

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asylum by women, on the grounds that the men of their own countries are oppressing theme, literally billions could claim immigration rights if they could just raise the price of a one-way ticket to the West.

The prime problem is that 94% of the increase in world population is taking place in what are euphemistically called "developing countries" – although many would perhaps be more accurately styled as "regressing countries." Despite massive financial aid and gifts of food, medicines and goods, many of these countries are sinking under the burden of their own population explosion. In sub-Saharan Africa, women on average produce six to seven live births. Indeed, famine in Saharan Africa is almost entirely the result of overpopulation, as the exploding human population, and that of the animals on which they depend for food, rises to levels which the increasingly depleted soil cannot support.

It is further estimated that, with continued food, medical and financial support from the more advanced nations of the world, by the turn of the century the truly basket-case countries will contain no less than 2.6 billion young people of 25 years of age or under. Consequently even a modest fall in the birthrate, coupled with the greater number of people of child-bearing age, would not prevent the population of these areas from increasing yet more rapidly.

Most of the peoples of the Third World until recently depended on agriculture for their subsistence, but the countryside is increasingly unable to support them and so they are flowing into the nearest cities, which are growing at a phenomenal rate. The Hudson Institute reports that "hundreds of millions of new workers [are] flooding into the cities of the developing world."[9] But as these cites cease to be able to absorb the hordes that are entering them, increasing numbers are flowing toward the already highly populated cities of Europe and North America.

The Amsterdam Declaration

What can be done about this? Meeting in Holland in 1989 representatives of the United Nations Population Fund, adopted a resolution arrived at by consensus between the governmental

[9] *Workforce 2000* (Indianapolis: Hudson Institute, 1987), p. 8.

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representatives of no less than 79 countries. This resolution bore the impressive title, "A Better Life for Future Generations: The Amsterdam Declaration." Yet its recommendations only served to defeat its intended goal. While noting the looming disaster implicit in the Third World population explosion, the Amsterdam Declaration called primarily for a *reduction* in the rate of infant mortality by the year 2000 and an *increase* in the life expectancy at birth to 62 years or more for men and women in countries with already exploding populations! The delegates seem to have overlooked the fact that these seemingly humanitarian proposals would effectively fuel the population explosion and promote further resultant human misery rather than the reverse.

When both human and animal populations over-reproduce, Nature has to find some way of restoring an ecologically acceptable balance; and if birth rates are high then a high mortality rate is the only solution – a solution, what is more, that Nature will only be able to impose upon Mankind *after* the environment and other forms of advanced life have suffered possibly irreparable harm. And Nature will achieve this goal by means much crueler than those that any form of humanely-encouraged restraint would involve. Already we may note daily reports not only of starvation, famine, disease and massive loss of life through natural disasters but also of bitter inter-human conflict, as crowded masses of people impinge on each others' efforts to command the resources necessary for survival.

How then did the Amsterdam Declaration propose to ease the problem of pressure of population on resources? The only recommendations that were widely agreed upon were those aimed at reducing mortality rates still further (AIDS was one of the concerns to be targeted) and at achieving "a better geographical distribution of the population." While this is a reasonable goal within national territories, the reality is that those nations which are over-reproducing themselves are now seeking to solve their problem by exporting their surplus to other countries. India, Africa and China alone are quite capable of populating the entire world with their surplus, in a migratory trend which might only stop when the entire world population had reached survival levels – levels which will be dictated only by an increase in child and adult mortality rates.

More Conferences

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A further conference on the population threat, held in Cairo, similarly failed to achieve any results. The world population has already increased by nearly half a billion since the last such conference held in Mexico City (itself a center of gross overpopulation and pollution), which similarly achieved nothing. Realists point out that the well-intended activities of the World Health Organization are actually responsible for much of the human misery that stalks the world today – simply because nobody cared to think about the implications of upsetting the balance of nature where human demography was concerned.

The subject of over-population was almost totally by-passed in the subsequent world conference held in Rio de Janeiro to discuss the rapid ecological degeneration of our planet. This, likewise, achieved nothing real. Some Third World countries, supported by the Vatican, broadly refused to discuss population control, although a number *are* aware of the immediate threat that the population explosion represents to their own economic well-being. Instead, some of the Third World delegates made the conference an opportunity to protest "Western imperialism's" efforts to persuade them to limit excessive deforestation, claiming that they had the right to exercise dominion over those parts of the earth that had been transferred to them following the relinquishment of Empire by the Western nations. In short, although the organizers did valiantly attempt to alert the peoples of the entire world to the destruction of our planet as a result of the demographic explosion, the prime outcome of the conference was a demand for the transfer of even more wealth from the West to further support the burgeoning population of the more backward countries.

Emigration as Governmental Policy

Readers anxious to continue their lives free from cares as to the future in store for the next generation of humanity may seek to placate their fears by dismissing these realities as little more than an impassioned diatribe that has little basis in reality. But those who resort to this deception clearly know little of the misery of life in the overcrowded cities of South Asia, as exemplified by Calcutta.

In the past, most governments strove to keep their subjects within the boundaries of their geographical control. However, we are now beginning to see different attitudes developing as to emigration.

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While Marxist North Korea still seeks to prevent its citizens from fleeing its grasp, the government of South Korea some decades ago realized that internal population pressures could create economic problems, and initiated a system of subsidies for any Korean family that could find another country to admit them. China, also, no longer seems to be discouraging the emigration of surplus members of its population, and is actively directing the migration of surplus Han Chinese into Tibet and the Turkic province formerly known as Sinkiang or "Chinese" Turkestan.

Malaysia is one of the more dynamic of Third World societies, yet even President Mahathir of that economically progressive nation knows that his country faces disaster because of the pressure of population on resources. Malaysia rigorously resisted the attempted immigration of southeast Asian migrant "Boat People" into the already overcrowded Malayan peninsula, and more recently Dr. Mahathir has shown a serious interest in emigration as a solution to overcrowding and the economic pressures attendant on that condition. His solution, which differs little from the solution of increasing numbers of "non-emerging" countries, is to ease the burden of population by exporting people to the Western countries which he blames for setbacks in Malaysia's own economy.

Claiming, as most Third World political leaders like to claim, that the more advanced nations have a responsibility to support the burgeoning population of the more fecund countries, in 1997 Dr. Mahathir alleged that poverty in the over-populated countries of the world was the fault of the West: but that the former had a weapon to use against the latter – mass migration. The more fecund and consequently more poverty-stricken countries should swamp the Western nations with immigrants!

Speaking to the heads of government of 12 regional countries, Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe, at the inaugural Southern African International Dialogue in Botswana, Dr. Mahathir complained that instead of sharing its wealth the West was trying to tell the Third World how to run its economies. He complained that "the North" was attempting to "recolonize" "the South," and urged that if this continued

"'people mobility' was the ultimate weapon of the developing

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"South" nations against the developed "North" .... We should migrate North in the millions, legally or illegally .... '[M]asses of Asians and Africans should inundate Europe and America.'"[10]

In the past, nations sent well-equipped armies to seize the wealth and territory of their more productive neighbors. In the future, both wealth and territory may continue to be the target of military conflict; but they are also increasingly likely to be seized by unarmed invasions conducted by migrant hordes. We can already see the first waves of migrants moving across the surface of our already over-populated globe, fleeing the environmentally-devastated areas to descend on countries which can provide them, at least for the immediate future, with some hope of feeding their children. Thus Peter Drucker writes that unless there is rapid development in the Third World "the developed countries will be inundated by a human flood of Third World immigrants far beyond their economic, social, or cultural capacity to absorb."[11] Paul Kennedy similarly notes that "in view of the imbalances in demographic trends between 'have' and 'have-not' societies, it seems unlikely that there will not be great waves of migration in the twenty-first century."[12]

So far attempts to raise the standard of living in the worst-afflicted areas have merely served to fuel the population explosion, and aggravate the situation. Some have likened aid to oil poured on fire; others have argued that each nation should bear the responsibility of providing for its own children, or of restricting its population increase to the levels it can maintain without stealing its neighbors lands or property. Excusing oneself from such ethical disputes, one can only ask what will happen if, as a result of this rising tide of mass migration, the entire world becomes populated beyond its environmental carrying-capacity? This is not a rhetorical question.

Conclusion

Until this century, much migration was spontaneous and individual, although instances of government-sponsored emigration – as distinct from outright military invasion and conquest – were by no

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[10] Reported in *The Australian*, May 7, 1997.

[11] Peter F. Drucker, *Post-Capitalist Society* (New York: HarperBusiness, 1993), p. 14.

[12] Kennedy, *Preparing for the Twenty-First Century*, p. 44.

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means rare. But in light of global demographic realities there is an increasing likelihood that more governments may encourage rather than restrict mass emigration as a means of mitigating internal demographic pressures. This does not bode well for the future peace of mankind. The Chinese government may already have concluded that the emigration of a percentage of its one and a quarter billion citizens to other countries is to be favored rather than discouraged, and the governments of such countries as Bangla Desh, Pakistan, and India – which together far outnumber even China's population and have a much higher rate of annual increase – may well be ready to look upon emigration with a sympathetic if not supportive eye. Given that the population of India alone increases every four days by more than the total population of Europe's oldest democracy, Iceland, and every three months by more than the total population of Norway, such figures lend graphic realism to Dr. Mahathir's threat that in the coming decades many of the more fecund Third World countries might well choose to use mass emigration as an effective economic and political weapon. It is an easy solution to the problem of retaining internal stability in a country drowning in the results of its own fecundity and the conscious or unconscious preference of its population for reproduction over self-restraint. It is a solution that few governments faced with this problem are likely to reject.

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An Economic Paradox? Displacement and Polarization in a Booming Economy

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During much of the 1990s, the United States economy has experienced a boom, with rising productivity and employment. Since mid-decade, moreover, the American public has lost much of its apprehension about "downsizing" and its devastating effects on people whose jobs are displaced. Nevertheless, in the midst of it all, the downsizing has not only continued, but has increased, with companies constantly announcing reductions in workforce. What is underway is an interesting combination of forces: increasing productivity due to advancing computerized technology; a vast expansion of service employment in an economy that as yet remains labor-intensive in those areas; the continuing reduction of manufacturing and agricultural employment – all with an underlying development of a technology that offers to become non-labor-intensive in *all* areas, including the service sector. This is leading to an increasing polarization of incomes and of wealth, raising substantial questions that even the most devoted follower of a market system must ultimately address.

Key Words: United States economy, polarization of income and wealth, non-labor-intensive technology, downsizing, computerization, market system, inequality, displacement of workers, disintermediation, de-skilling.

It may seem a paradox, but in fact it is the new economic paradigm (at least for the medium-term) for such an advanced economy as the United States': a sustained economic boom with increasing productivity and the addition of millions of jobs, while at the same time vast underlying forces continue unabated, and are even accelerated, that point toward the displacement and marginalization of workers, firms and even industries, and to a polarization of incomes and wealth. These "underlying forces" are the rapid movement into non-labor-intensive technology, immigration, and global competition with low-pay workers, both unskilled and skilled, in the less developed economies.

The boom masks those underlying trends, and in the United States the public anxiety over "downsizing" has greatly diminished since it was at its height in the mid-1990s. Employment continues to

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grow despite job displacement and marginalization. Why? Because there is such great demand for skilled labor as the new technologies are being developed and implemented, and because 98 percent of the economy (to make up a fanciful percentage that will suggest the extent of the changes that are to come) continues along the lines of the "old (labor-intensive) economy." Construction employment, for example, continues to grow in an industry that is still largely devoted to traditional stick-by-stick methods; the impact of robotics, in-factory construction and the new "materials sciences" has so far hardly been felt.

This is not to suggest that the business cycle has necessarily been repealed. A "boom economy" is dependent upon many variables. So a "boom" and a masking of the displacement may at times not seem paradigmatic. Nevertheless, the impact of the scientific, technical and competitive revolution underway will be such that, subject to some vicissitudes, productivity can be expected to climb prodigiously over the long run, and that in virtually all sectors of the economy the trend will be toward non-labor-intensivity.

Despite all the turmoil created over the past 20 years by "downsizing," displacement has been slight compared to that which will occur during the next few years. What we need to grasp is that the downsizings, layoffs and "early retirements" of recent years are not passing phenomena, despite the boom. They are just early examples of a massive long-term secular tendency.

The extent to which the world is just barely into the scientific-technical revolution that is occurring was brought home to this author recently when he was talking with a surgeon about removing a melanoma from his left ear. At first, it seemed that the whole ear would have to be taken off, then just the top third, and finally just a large square out of the top third. As it has turned out, a skin graft is restoring the ear, after surgery, to some semblance of normality. I mentioned to the surgeon that I had seen on television an actual case of a human ear being grown out of the back of a mouse. "Would it be possible just to take some of my DNA and grow me a new ear of my own that could then be attached?" This drew a laugh from the surgeon, to whom the question no doubt sounded naive. He explained that the clinical application of the body-parts-growing DNA technology is still years away. Outside the laboratory, we are still with the old surgery, albeit that has improved greatly from the surgery

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of just a few decades ago.

A Centuries-long Shift

A centuries-long shift of human effort has taken place from agriculture into manufacturing and more recently into services. Most of the world's population worked in agriculture until well into the Industrial Revolution; in fact, the recently deceased Sir James Goldsmith said that, worldwide, 3.1 billion people still work on farms.[1] With the rise of industry, people left the country and flooded into the newly emerging factory towns. Where this occurred, the result was astonishing: by 1994 only 2.5 percent of Americans remained in agriculture while at the same time farm output exceeded all prior records.[2] (A larger percentage are involved if "agriculture-related industries" are considered, but those who point to that as a seeming rebuttal appear to be evading the central fact.) Now Paul Strassman tells of yet another astonishing development: that "with robots, factories can operate with less than 15% of the workforce." This, in turn, has led to "an enormous expansion of employment in the service sector."[3]

The move from manufacturing to services (while there has been a continuing increase, also, in manufacturing output) is demonstrated by Cohen and Zysman: "The data show a relentless decline in manufacturing employment, from about 50 percent of all jobs in 1950 down to about 20 percent now [1987], and an irresistible increase in service jobs, up to about 70 percent of all jobs." Manufacturing in the United States hadn't increased its net employment since 1973.[4] *Business Week* reported in 1994 that during the 1980s "the service sector accounted for practically all of the growth in jobs and corporate profits."[5] In July 1999, the Federal Reserve reported that

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[1] Sir James Goldsmith, *The Trap* (New York: Carroll & Graf Publishers, Inc., 1995), p. 106.

[2] Wallace C. Peterson, *Silent Depression* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1994), p. 193.

[3] Paul A. Strassman, *Information Payoff: The Transformation of Work in the Electronic Age* (New York: The Free Press, 1985), p. 215.

[4] Stephen S. Cohen and John Zysman, *Manufacturing Matters: The Myth of the Post-Industrial Economy* (New York: Basic Books, Inc., Publishers, 1987), p. 54. See p. 13 for their statement that agricultural production has increased immensely.

[5] *Business Week*, "The Information Revolution 1994," p. 22.

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manufacturing output has continued to rise while at the same time "the manufacturing sector continued to lose jobs," including 488,000 between March 1998 and July 1999. The Associated Press tells how "economists said productivity gains – largely through computers and other technological improvements in the workplace – help explain why output rose even as jobs were shed."[6]

The other advanced economies have experienced much the same. Jaroslaw Wieczorek reports that "in the United Kingdom, the share of manufacturing employment was 33 percent in 1900 and remained at more or less the same level until 1960... [but] by 1990, the share of manufacturing employment in the United Kingdom was barely half its 1956 level." In Germany, "its share of 30 percent in 1990 seems relatively low compared with the 1969 peak of about 45 percent."[7]

The Specifics of Displacement

Of Farmers

About agricultural displacement, Jeremy Rifkin, author of *The End of Work*, says that "new breakthroughs in the information and life sciences threaten to end much of outdoor farming by the middle decades of the coming century... leading to a world without farmers."[8] Even before the indoor, factory-like farm comes to predominate, fields will be farmed by "sophisticated computerized robots."[9] As Third World farmers become more efficient, farm production will multiply while at the same time hundreds of millions of people who now rely upon it for their income will be displaced. Paul Kennedy tells how genetically engineered soybean or rapeseed threatens to replace coconut oil, "upon [the export of] which one-quarter of the Philippine population is at least partially dependent." He says the laboratory production of rubber could put some 16 million workers out of work in such rubber-producing countries as Indonesia and

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[6] *Denver Rocky Mountain News*, July 17, 1999, Associate Press report by Jeannine Aversa.

[7] Jaroslaw Wieczorek, "Sectoral Trends in World Employment and the Shift Toward Services," *International Labour Review*, Vol. 134, 1995, No. 2, p. 216.

[8] Rifkin, *End of Work*, p. 109.

[9] Rifkin, *End of Work*, p. 110.

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Malaysia.[10] In Europe, according to Edward Yoxen and Vittorio Di Martino, the pressures from biotechnology are such that some farmers fear extinction. Those authors say that accelerating farm technology is making productivity grow faster than demand, leading in Europe to falling land prices and ever fewer farms and farmers.[11]

The displacement makes the small farm particularly obsolete. An example came during the 1998 controversy in Kansas over the introduction of "hog megafarms." A company was given permission to establish two farms that together would have 40,000 sows (which could have as many as 500,000 piglets per year). This led to a movement of western Kansas farmers known as Families Against Corporate Takeover.[12] The number of hog farms in Kansas fell from 22,000 in 1965 to 3,600 in 1997, and the number continues to fall.[13]

An analysis of trends within American agriculture in the *Wichita Eagle* in late June 1999 indicates that "the number of full-time farmers is falling fast... As new technologies displace people, farms keep consolidating into fewer and larger enterprises... And yet there's no food crisis in America... Farmers continue to produce mountains of food."[14]

A news report on dairy farming in late 1996 spoke of a nationwide trend that "has been reducing dairies all over the country at a fairly steady rate for the last two decades." It said "in 1995 and 1996 the trend has escalated steeply. Nationally, there were 647,000 farms with milk cows in 1970, according to the Agriculture Statistics Service. There were only 140,000 in 1995." It speaks of "mega-dairy operations" that have taken the place of the small farm.[15] In light of the new mass production and applications of biotechnology, it is hard to imagine that the individual farmer will continue, within a few years, to have any appreciable place, except on a hobbyist basis.

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[10] Kennedy, *Preparing for...*, p. 80.

[11] Edward Yoxen and Vittorio Di Martino, ed.s, *Biotechnology in Future Society: Scenarios and Options for Europe* (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1989), pp. 6, 11.

[12] *Wichita Eagle*, June 19, 1998.

[13] *Wichita Eagle*, November 22, 1998.

[14] *Wichita Eagle*, June 27, 1999.

[15] *Wichita Eagle*, November 3, 1996, report by Phyllis Jacobs Griekspoor.

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Of Workers

Economic theory says that if wages are flexible there will, subject to some frictional disconnections, always be demand for as many people as want to work. The stagnation of incomes and a polarization of wealth can serve as alternatives to unemployment. In this article, it is enough to see the impact of the new technology on the jobs that have existed. That impact has already been enormous even in its incipient stages.

Tevi Troy at the Hudson Institute reported in May 1996 that "forty-three million jobs have been eliminated in the United States since 1979. Many of these downsized workers cannot find other jobs and, when they do, find them at lower wages...."[16] Wallace Peterson cites a study telling how in the United States between 1973 and 1986 a great many young males left the workforce altogether, disappearing from unemployment statistics.[17]

As we have noted, the displacement of workers has been masked in the late 1990s by the economic boom. A May 1999 news report says that "in April, the national economy added, on a net basis, nearly a quarter of a million new jobs despite continued losses in manufacturing and farming."[18] Just the same, a news account a year earlier (in April 1998) said that "corporate layoff announcements [are] up 38% over year-ago levels";[19] and a news report in June 1998 said "the total number of cuts for this year is surpassing that of last year and could reach 500,000."[20] In fact, a later news report showed layoffs exceeded even that prediction: 575,000 just through November;[21] and a recap in January 1999 said that there were an additional 103,166 in December.[22]

Although "anecdotal," specifics help to flesh out the statistics:

• Press clippings for 1999 and late 1998 show new hiring (as by Ameritech Corp.-SBC Communications, Unisys and Intek Informa-

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[16] Tevi Troy, "U.S. job options still exist," *Wichita Eagle*, May 20, 1996.

[17] Peterson, *Silent Depression*, p. 82.

[18] *Wichita Eagle*, May 8, 1999, referring to a Labor Department report.

[19] *Business Week*, April 13, 1998, column by Gene Koretz.

[20] *Wichita Eagle*, June 5, 1998. Notice the favorable economic hype, though, when the news item is headed "Job cuts down 76 percent from April."

[21] *Wichita Eagle,* December 16, 1998.

[22] *Wichita Eagle,* January 8, 1999.

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tion Inc.), but also show many companies cutting their workforces: Raytheon Co, 14,000 (16%) over two years, even though "business is good"; Merrill Lynch & Co., 3,400 (5.2%); J. P. Morgan, 700 (5%); Heinz, 400; Amway, 542 (10%); Eastman Kodak, 20,000 (20%); Boeing, 48,000 after June 1998; Kellogg Co., 525 salaried workers (21% of North America office force); AB Volvo, 5,300 worldwide, plus 700 consultant positions; Chesapeake Corp., 250 (5%); Levitz Furniture Corp., 1,000 (25%); Citigroup Inc., 10,400 (6.5%). Levi Strauss is moving its jean production overseas, and closing 24 plants in the United States and Canada in 1998 and 1999, with a 30 percent cut in its workforce in those countries.[23] In June 1999, Procter & Gamble announced it "will eliminate 15,000 jobs [including 4,300 in North America] and close 10 plants over the next six years in a move designed to cut costs, introduce new products faster, and boost sales."[24] Notice that reducing the workforce is not considered inconsistent with, but is rather conducive to, increased profits and competitiveness.

- In 1989, the *Arizona Republic* reported that "it takes 50 percent fewer man-hours to produce a ton of steel today than it did at the beginning of the 1980s." That same year, the *Sacramento Bee* said the number of U.S. steelworkers had dropped from 400,000 in 1980 to 155,000 in 1989 – even as production increased.[25]
- William Greider wrote in 1997 that "General Electric tripled its revenues and profits during the last fifteen years, while it shrank its worldwide workforce from 435,000 to 220,000."[26]
- Kevin Phillips tells how "General Motors announced that 15,000 of its 99,000 salaried positions would be eliminated between 1991 and 1993," and says that a million and a half American white-collar workers lost their jobs in the 1980s, a trend that would accelerate in the 1990s.[27] The 1998 General Motors strike was largely over "job security" as GM sought to expand production in new factories overseas and to reduce its American workforce. The strike

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[23] *Wichita Eagle*, February 23, 1999.

[24] *Wichita Eagle*, June 10, 1999.

[25] Both articles appear on p. 40 of Oliver Trager, ed., *Can America Compete?* (New York: Facts on File, no publication year given).

[26] Greider, *One World, Ready or Not*, p. 216.

[27] Kevin Phillips, *Boiling Point* (New York: Random House, 1993), p. 11.

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ended without assurances on that major issue.[28]

• In February 1998, a news report told of AT&T's plan to cut 18,000 more jobs, and said that "since 1993, AT&T has announced job cuts five times, introducing plans to eliminate a total of 85,500 positions." This has all been part of a "struggle to remake itself" in which the company has continued "to find that thousands of its employees are superfluous."[29]

• When the 1998 merger of BankAmerica and NationsBank was announced, the plan was to cut 8,000 jobs (4.4% of the workforce) to help produce a $10 billion annual profit.[30]

• The frequency of such reports is well illustrated by there having been a report two days later, on February 10, 1998, that Paging Network, Inc., was about to "cut 1,800 jobs, or 30 percent of its U.S. workers."[31] • Alfred Balk says that "in mining, since World War II employment has fallen by 300,000 while production has risen by half. In textiles, yardage has remained constant despite cutting 550,000 jobs." "In 1987, Ford made 10 percent more cars than nine years earlier – with 47 percent fewer production workers." In the mid-1980s, "GM, in one restructuring, announced a cutback of 29,000 workers."[32]

• Greider tells how in the two decades between 1971 and 1991 the worldwide employment by "the world's 500 largest multinational corporations" remained flat at "around 26 million people" while their sales multiplied sevenfold.[33] David Boaz of the Cato Institute says that during the 1980s "employment in the Fortune 500 fell by three-and-a-half million."[34] In early 1996, *Business Week* reported a study by Harvard business school professor Nitin Nohria of 100 of the United States' largest companies; Nohria found that from 1978 to

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[28] *Wichita Eagle*, July 29, 1998, report by Keith Bradsher of the New York Times News Service.

[29] *Wichita Eagle*, February 8, 1998, New York Times News Service report by Seth Schiesel.

[30] *Wichita Eagle*, August 18, 1998.

[31] *Wichita Eagle*, February 10, 1998.

[32] Alfred Balk, *The Myth of American Eclipse* (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1990), p. 45.

[33] Greider, *One World, Ready or Not*, p. 21.

[34] David Boaz, "Industrial Policy Marches On, Despite a History of Failure," *Human Events*.

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1996 they laid off three million workers, 77 percent of them white-collar. It was a net 22 percent of the companies' total workforce.[35]

- *Fortune* magazine cited the Hudson Institute in April 1996 as projecting a loss of 160,000 jobs in utilities during the next few years because of consolidations and restructurings. The same article said "Deloitte & Touche's financial services consulting group estimates that 450,000 banking jobs will vanish over the next five to ten years," with the most vulnerable employees being "tellers, clerks, and their supervisors."[36]
- "U.S. flag merchant vessels employ[ed] 110,800 seamen" in 1947, but this diminished to only 18,300 in 1981, according to Jay Olnek.[37]
- As to office work, Fred Block tells how "the initial period of computerization created large numbers of low-skilled data-entry jobs – many of which have subsequently been eliminated with more sophisticated data-entry systems... Entering information with an optical scanner is already cheaper than hiring keypunchers in the Third World."[38]
- *The Economist* says "telephone operators are being replaced by voice-recognising computers, postal workers by address-reading machines, bank tellers by cash-dispensing machines that can handle ten times as many transactions in a day."[39]
- "Electronic synthesizers have markedly reduced employment possibilities for studio musicians," according to an ILO symposium.[40]
- The Clinton administration in the United States instituted a "national performance review" with the announced goal of cutting 252,000 government jobs, a goal that was later raised to 272,900.[41] This has had a major impact on all federal government departments during the 1990s.
- Librarianship, according to an article in *Mother Jones* in

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[35] *Business Week*, March 11, 1996, p. 50.

[36] *Fortune*, April 1, 1996, p. 76.

[37] Jay I. Olnek, *The Invisible Hand* (New York: North Stonington Press, 2nd ed. 1984), p. 81.

[38] Block, *Postindustrial Possibilities: A Critique of Economic Discourse:* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), pp. 104, 106.

[39] *The Economist*, February 11, 1995.

[40] *World of Work*, No. 19, 1997, p. 11.

[41] *Jobs & Capital*, Vol. V, Spring 1996, p. 38.

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October 1995, is among the "professions facing extinction at the hands of machines over the next 20 years."[42]

- Even so obscure a profession as braille translator is disappearing. A news report in July 1997 said "the demand for braille translation has declined... now that computer programs can translate mass publications. The braille language for reading has been besieged by audio tapes, voice-recognition computers and other devices."[43]
- In early 1997, it was reported that the unemployment rate in France had reached 12.6 percent. "More than 1 million people have been out of work longer than a year, a number that is rising... Young people especially are hard hit... Nearly 25 percent of those between 18 and 25 are officially unemployed but the real figure is considered much higher. Young people routinely are shunted into one training program after another, interspersed with short-term or part-time jobs. The majority of them live with their families... Fear of unemployment also permeates France's management class...."[44] In late January 1998, *Business Week* said that "overnight, France's silent masses of unemployed have become a powerful political force. Rallying outside public offices by day and setting bonfires in front of benefits offices by night, they are riveting international attention on the growing gap between France's rich and poor. The stark reality of 1 million long-term jobless getting a paltry $350 a month in benefits has jolted a nation that prides itself on compassion." The article spoke of "a broad sense of betrayal" and of "evidence of rents in France's social fabric."[45]
- The next month, in February 1998, *The Economist* said "the German jobless total is edging inexorably up." Unemployment there is "nearly five times higher than two decades ago."[46]

Of Firms

A vast churning is occurring among business firms, where the

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[42] The *Mother Jones* article is commented upon in the *Library Journal*, October 1, 1995, p. 13.

[43] *Wichita Eagle*, July 1, 1997.

[44] *Insight*, January 20, 1997, pp. 45-6.

[45] *Business Week*, January 26, 1998, p. 44.

[46] *The Economist*, February 7, 1998, p. 52.

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struggle to survive amid lowest-cost world competition leads to much desperate activity. Larger-scale enterprises such as Wal-Mart, which has displaced countless small-town retailers, have succeeded, although they themselves will soon be threatened by direct consumer-factory transactions through the Internet. At the same time, the new technology lends itself to tiny business units serving unique niche-markets.

Firms and production facilities flee to the places of lowest-cost labor, only to move again when a still-lower-cost location is found; by 1992, there were 1800 U.S. manufacturing facilities, with half a million workers, across the border in Mexico as part of Mexico's Maquiladora program. MagneTek set up a 150,000-square-foot factory across the Rio Grande from Brownsville, Texas. It is not simply that American companies are moving south; Asian companies are also moving to northern Mexico. Some of the production is high-skilled, since Mexican engineers make just half as much as American engineers.[47]

By 1992, no television sets were made in America; Zenith Corporation had just "turned out the lights" by moving the final production facility from Springfield, Missouri, to Reynosa, Mexico.[48] By the end of 1998, two-thirds of all television sets sold in North America were manufactured in Baja California.[49] In June 1998 it was reported that Motorola cut 15,000 jobs worldwide while it planned to increase its investment in China from $1.1 to $2.5 billion during the following two years. Its employment is going up there, and in Sichuan province "Chinese workers already manufacture 1.4 billion semiconductor components a year."[50]

Other specifics:

- The Kansas town of Winfield was hard-hit in January 1997 when crayon-maker Binney & Smith closed its plant after 44 years, abolishing 345 of the city's highest-paying jobs. The company's CEO explained that "improvements in automated machines had tripled

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[47] *Washington Times' National Weekly Edition*, November 30-December 6, 1998.

[48] Donald L. Barlett and James B. Steele, *America: What Went Wrong* (Kansas City: Andrews and McMeel, 1992), pp. 34, 35.

[49] Ibid.

[50] *Wichita Eagle*, June 21, 1998, Cox News Service report.

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production at the company's plant in Easton, Pa." The *Wichita Eagle* said "the closing is the latest in a series of shutdowns that have devastated Cowley County in recent years."[51]

- IBM's policy was one of employee-retention until competition forced the company to abandon it in the mid-1980s, after which the firm cut its workforce from 405,000 employees to 225,000 by early 1996.[52]
- Sears "has shed 50,000 people during the 1990s," according to *Fortune* in the same 1996 article.
- AT&T, *Fortune* said, "employs roughly 300,000 – and plans on reducing that number by two-thirds by 1998."
- In November 1997, Eastman Kodak announced it was cutting 10,000 jobs in the latest of a half-dozen restructurings that began in 1983.[53]
- The same day, Fruit of the Loom, Inc., told the press it would discard 2,900 workers in the United States, which is 19 percent of its workforce in the U.S., after already cutting 4,200 jobs in the preceding three months. It would close its plant in Louisiana and move to lower-cost plants in other countries. The news report said "Fruit of the Loom contended it has been forced by the North American Free Trade Agreement and a global trade accord to look for cheaper labor. Workers at its American plants earn an average of $10 an hour; those overseas fetch as little as 35 cents an hour."[54]

Of Industries

Whole industries are churning. There is a struggle to survive similar to that of individuals and firms:

- *Business Week* in late 1995 told about deep-water oil and gas production. Large platforms costing almost $1 billion are giving way to automated production technology located on the ocean floor. Pumps will get the oil and gas to shore.[55]
- In the steel industry, minimills that melt steel scrap have

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[51] *Wichita Eagle*, January 14, 1997.
[52] Joseph Nocera, "Living With Layoffs," *Fortune*, April 1, 1996, p. 69.
[53] *Wichita Eagle*, November 12, 1997.
[54] *Wichita Eagle*, November 12, 1997, report by Associated Press.
[55] *Business Week*, October 30, 1995, p. 74.

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become major competitors with the big steel companies. "Their secret," according to *Business Week*, is "state-of-the-art technology, nonunion labor, and flexible mills near their markets." At the same time, the large steel companies, after being protected by the Reagan administration's "voluntary restraint arrangements" limiting imports, have become competitive again by invested many billions of dollars in modernization and drastically cutting their workforce.[56]

- William Davidow refers to a "process of disintermediation – getting rid of services that are in the middle." This will go far toward eliminating wholesalers, retail stores, publications carrying advertising, travel agents, automobile dealers, stockbrokers, and even educational institutions.[57] This is illustrated by a news report in February 1998 that "online stock trading... is changing the way stocks are bought and sold. More than 3 million Americans have active online stock accounts, and they're saving hundreds of millions of dollars using them... They formerly used a broker who charged $100 or so per trade – but now use an online broker that charges $12." Even the cost of online trading is falling: "In 1996, an average online trade cost about $30. The average today is less than $15. And the cost is likely to continue to go down."[58] As "disintermediation" occurs in one area after another, the present economy will change beyond recognition.
- Historian-businessman Otto Scott says "U.S. shipyards are gone: vanished into the mist of 'free trade' that has turned so many U.S. heavy industries over to other countries and peoples. The vessels that arrive in our ports are virtually all foreign-owned, built in foreign shipyards."[59]
- Although *The Economist* says "technology will never replace teachers,"[60] the continued existence of universities is problematical. "Distance-learning" is coming in rapidly, with a great many educational suppliers beginning to compete through the Internet and interactive video. They will offer students accredited courses, degrees and

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[56] *Business Week*, August 22, 1994, p. 25.

[57] William Davidow, "The Buck No Longer Stops Here," *Forbes ASAP*, February 24, 1997, p. 24.

[58] *Wichita Eagle*, February 1, 1998, Knight Ridder News Service report by David Hayes.

[59] *Otto Scott's Compass*, December 1, 1996, p. 8.

[60] *The Economist*, September 28, 1996, p. 45.

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various credentials at a fraction of the present cost. If, to speak hypothetically, a student can take a for-credit course on the "History of Western Civilization" from an Oxford professor for $11 instead of a similar course from a local university for $300, who's to say that the latter won't be under threat of extinction? Parker Rossman says "millions of students take courses electronically, many scholars use electronic networks for global-scale research projects, and other signs point to the emergence of a worldwide electronic university." The National University Teleconferencing Network was established as early as 1982 to offer programs by satellite. Two years later the National Technological University was formed as a consortium of engineering departments, and offers degrees. The "Mind Extension University" awards MBA degrees through cable television. Rossman tells of research showing that distance-learning students do as well as students in classrooms. He mentions that Herbert London of New York University predicts "the end of the university as most Americans picture it."[61] In mid-1998, Oxford University announced that it would begin offering Internet courses, using "special tutors [to] supervise studies, using e-mail, Internet discussions and voice-based conferencing."[62]

The impact on university personnel is already apparent. *Business Week* has reported a nationwide move to weaken tenure, saying it "is being driven as universities struggle with high costs." Here is a fact worth noting: "Some 47% of university faculty now are part-timers, vs. 32% in 1980, according to the AAUP."[63]

The challenge to public universities becomes especially clear when we consider that their funding has been based on "credit-hour production"; i.e., the number of students taught. The funding of teaching has then carried with it, as if it were an incidental, the "community of scholars" that make up the heart and soul of a true university. The professors do some teaching but mainly pursue a life of the mind. If the teaching function disappears in a welter of electronic competition, will state legislatures make the leap from the old funding method to one that will simply pay to maintain the

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[61] Parker Rossman, *The Emerging Worldwide Electronic University: Information Age Global Higher Education* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press), pp. 3, 6, 7, 11.

[62] *Wichita Eagle*, July 21, 1998.

[63] *Business Week*, June 10, 1996, p. 40.

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community of scholars as such? Will contributors to private university endowments make the leap, either? It is doubtful in both instances, since continued funding will require a higher level of appreciation of the scholarly function *per se* than probably exists. My experience as a professor is that most friends think I am enjoying time off while I am home writing a book or an article.

Of National Economies

Rifkin says that "vanilla is the most popular flavor in America" and that "in Madagascar alone, which produces more than 70 percent of the world's harvest [of vanilla], 70,000 peasant farmers rely on this single crop for their livelihood." It has been discovered, however, that the expensive hand-pollination that goes into raising a vanilla orchard can be replaced by inexpensive gene-splicing techniques. Vanilla can be made in large laboratory vats "by isolating the gene that codes for the vanilla protein and cloning it in a bacterial bath." This makes the Madagascar farmers obsolete.[64] In this we see a prototype of what is going to face the countries and peoples who are not high-tech. A harbinger of the future appears in the September 1998 news report that "tens of thousands of Brazilians marched to demand relief from poverty and neglect on Monday, the country's Independence Day. In dozens of cities, the fourth annual 'Cry of the Excluded' rallies drew the landless and the jobless...."[65]

Will Skilled and Service Jobs Fill the Void?

When both high-skill tasks and services become non-labor-intensive, and that change has been fully absorbed into the economy, the displacement that has been underway for centuries will have reached a culmination. To those who fail to see this, high-tech and services are often looked to together as an inexhaustible frontier to absorb labor. This reflects the faith of the free marketer, whose philosophy tells him that in a market economy there will always be endless things to do, since scarcity is a given and human wants are infinite. Today, we hear this optimism expressed as the conventional

[64] Rifkin, *End of Work*, p. 124.
[65] *Wichita Eagle*, September 8, 1998.

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wisdom. In the movie "You've Got Mail," a small bookstore goes out of business when a giant store opens around the corner, but it is presented as a blessing-in-disguise because the small store's owner (played by Meg Ryan) goes on pluckily to become a writer of children's books. For many, there is a factual basis for the optimism. Scott Adams, the creator of the satirical comic strip "Dilbert," says that he hears from many readers who have been laid off – and who have gone on to better jobs.

But the optimism can hardly be the whole story. If the principal services come to be performable with only minor, rather than mass, human effort, we get to what Rifkin calls "the end of work." Edward Chase's review of Stanley Aronowitz and William DiFazio's *The Jobless Future: Sci-Tech and the Dogma of Work* says those authors "dismiss the lingering expectation that the high-tech era will ultimately provide more employment. 'The new technology has fewer parts and fewer workers and produces more product. This is true not only in traditional production industries but for all workers, including managers and technical workers.'"[66]

Even Services Will Require Less Human Input

Many services are coming to require less human input, as our review of the displacement has shown. A scan of the following developments will underscore that many services are becoming unneeded and that whatever takes their place is not likely to require mass human effort either:

- Fred Block points out that "the initial period of computerization created large numbers of low-skilled data-entry jobs," but that many "have subsequently been eliminated with more sophisticated data-entry systems."
- He cites J. David Roessner's *The Impact of Office Automation in Clerical Employment, 1985-2000* to the effect that clerical jobs in the banking industry are declining by 30 percent between 1985 and 2000.
- Keypunch jobs might for a while be exported to low-wage countries, but this won't last long. He says that "entering information

[66] Review by Edward T. Chase in *New Leader*, March 13, 1995.

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with an optical scanner is already cheaper than hiring keypunchers in the Third World."[67]

- Matzner and Wagner say that in the manufacture of an aircraft wing "software gauges, computer-controlled coordinate measuring machine [sic] may cut hundreds or thousands of hours from inspection tasks...."[68] [This is an example that illustrates, too, the gray area that has come into being between services and manufacture. How do you count "inspection"?]
- The same authors talk about computer-aided drafting's replacing manual drawing in architectural firms. Productivity rises sharply, "sometimes by factors of ten or more."[69]
- Middle-management and staff positions are disappearing. Writing in 1994, Wallace Peterson says that "since mid-1980, over two million middle-management jobs have been permanently eliminated."[70] Murray Weidenbaum tells how "when senior executives can receive up-to-the-minute information on a computer screen on their desks, a cadre of middle managers and corporate staffers is no longer needed to collect and interpret that information."[71]
- Because firms are becoming able to interface with their customers by online telecommunications, Harald Malmgren foresees a drastic reduction in the sales forces of large businesses.[72] The skills needed in retailing "are being reduced as a result of the computer-mediated centralization of the information process," according to Ken Ducatel.[73] Wholesalers, too, "are becoming redundant" as large marketing firms and even consumers deal directly with the factory.[74]

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[67] Block, *Postindustrial Possibilities*, pp. 103-105.

[68] Egon Matzner and Michael Wagner, ed.s, *The Employment Impact of New Technology: The Case of West Germany* (Aldershot: Gower Publishing Company Limited, 1990), pp. 44-5.

[69] Matzner and Wagner, *Employment Impact*, p. 46.

[70] Peterson, *Silent Depression*, p. 23.

[71] Murray Weidenbaum, "Outline of a New Social Contract," *Challenge*, January/February 1995.

[72] Harald B. Malmgren, "Technology and the Economy," in *The Global Economy*, William E. Brock and Robert D. Hormats, ed.s (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1990), pp. 105-6.

[73] Ken Ducatel, ed., *Employment and Technical Change in Europe* (Brookfield, VT: Edward Elgar Publishing Company, 1994), p. 4.

[74] Rifkin, *End of Work*, p. 151.

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Americans are regaled with reports of the number of new jobs created. In January 1999, the press told of a net gain of 2.9 million jobs in 1998.[75] A year earlier, *Business Week* told how "in the decade from 1986 to 1996, the U.S. economy... [added] 21 million jobs." The occupations that will add the most positions in the decade between 1996 and 2006 are cashiers, systems analysts, general managers and top executives, registered nurses, retail salespersons, truck drivers, home health aides, and teacher aides. "Service," the article said, "will account for almost all the job growth. Manufacturing is expected to shed some 35,000 jobs a year, with only construction boosting employment."[76] Notice that several of the service occupations that are expected to add jobs will eventually be displaced by technology: cashiers, retail salespersons, perhaps truck drivers, and construction workers.

Even at the height of the economic boom in the United States in 1998, there were few jobs for the unskilled. A survey released at the U.S. Conference of Mayors' national convention in June 1998 indicated, according to a news report, that "nationally, there are twice as many unskilled job-seekers as there are jobs available that require few or no skills."[77]

Even High-Tech Tasks Will Become Less Labor-Intensive

What about high-tech? It will continue to employ a rush of new talent to feed its rapid development and implementation. This need will be so great that for many years there will be vast opportunity there for those with the intelligence and aptitude. Because rapid innovation will remain a feature of society unless we allow our civilization to tear apart under the pressure of displacement and polarization, new opportunities will continue to arise in perpetuity for such people. But high technology's long-term tendency is to make its

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[75] *Wichita Eagle,* January 9, 1999.

[76] *Business Week*, January 26, 1998, p. 22.

[77] *Wichita Eagle*, June 20, 1998. Despite the content of the report indicating a lack of jobs nationally for the unskilled, the news item is given a favorable twist by emphasizing the local situation in Wichita; the headline reads "More unskilled jobs in Wichita than workers." It is understandable that the Wichita paper believes its readers are most interested in the local situation, but the result is, just the same, as example of the "good news" economic hype that has helped mask the displacement of workers and small businesses even during the boom.

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own workforce redundant. The present technology will be non-labor-intensive itself once it reaches maturity, and later innovations are likely to be non-labor-intensive as well. As the technology becomes self-automated and "user friendly," fewer skills are needed to run it, so that less high-skilled labor is required. This is referred to in the literature as "de-skilling." Harald Malmgren says that "production systems that become possible with CIM [computer integrated manufacturing] (such as robotics, automated transfer, laser processing, and new techniques for precision forming and shaping) will tend to reduce the significance of labor...."[78]

The Economist says that "even the skilled are at risk. Already, clever computer programs can diagnose some illnesses as well as doctors can. A robot that will perform hip replacements is under development in California. Some American companies are using Resumix, a computerised hiring system, to screen job applicants. In 1993, a 'computer-generated' novel was deemed no worse than hundreds of humanly crafted love stories published each year."[79]

The worldwide flight to low-pay labor affects the *high*-skilled as well as the *low*-skilled (but it will not be long before even the low-pay workforces of either type are eclipsed by even-lower-cost technology). Otto Scott confirms this when he says "the industrial migration that began with steel and the garment industries, automotives, aeronautics, shipbuilding and mining among others is now moving to computer chips, computer programming and equipment design centers in China, India, Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan and Australia – and South America."[80]

Will There Be Work for All?

It would seem from all of this that there is a strong empirical case, under impending circumstances, against the faith of those who hold that there will always be inexhaustible sources of work. The ready rebuttal is that "no one has ever been able to foresee what will occupy people in future generations." Along these lines, Peter Huber argues that "technology does indeed transform the nature of work...

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[78] Malmgren in *The Global Economy*, p. 98.

[79] *The Economist*, February 11, 1995, a review of Rifkin's *The End of Work* entitled "A World Without Jobs?."

[80] *Otto Scott's Compass*, October 1, 1995, p. 8.

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But it doesn't end it... Rifkin ... allows for no happy surprises, no unexpectedly favorable developments, no unanticipated opportunities for new kinds of workers."[81] John Nelson, now an emeritus professor of philosophy at the University of Colorado, expresses a similar expectation: "The bottomlessness of men's appetites, their technological inventiveness, their past accumulations of wealth or capital, the same effects can plausibly be maintained to hold good now as in the past... Inventors producing, through further innovations in technology and design, new goods and thus new appetites and their satisfaction."[82]

What this rebuttal misses is that we have never before seen a situation in which every field of endeavor will potentially be met by a technology that minimizes work. The situation is *sui generis*. One does not have to engage in the "lump of labor fallacy" (the simplistic view that there is just a fixed amount of work to be done in the world) to realize this. Human beings no doubt have vast future undertakings to adventure upon, including space and perhaps oceanic colonization. There is no end to the things that need doing just to bring everybody in the world up to the existing standard of living in the developed countries, much less to the potential standard that is visible on the horizon even today. So there is no thought of having a fixed amount of tasks to undertake. The question is whether they will employ hundreds of millions, even billions, of people. The president of one of Europe's conglomerates was on the mark recently when he asked, "Tell me where? In what jobs? In what cities? Which companies?"[83]

Will Training for High Skills Be the Answer?

The easiest and most common recourse is to say that "people must train themselves to be highly skilled, to work flexibly and to be comfortable with considerable insecurity." Today's literature is filled with this prescription. But it is wishful thinking, engaged in by commentators who are willing to grasp at any straw or to think only incompletely about a problem. They are excellent people, but they

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[81] Peter Huber, "Orwell, Rifkin and silicon," *Forbes*, October 23, 1995, p. 330.

[82] Letter from John Nelson to Dwight Murphey dated October 25, 1996.

[83] Quoted in the *Atlanta Business Chronicle*, April 21, 1995, in its review of Rifkin's *The End of Work*.

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forget two fundamentals: (a) First, that half the members of the human race are below 100 in I.Q. and have always found employment in repetitive tasks. These are people who have little aptitude for flexibility and little tolerance for ambiguity. It is no slur against them to point this out; it does not reflect upon their character or worth as human beings. But it does negate the expectation that they can *en masse* "turn to high-skill training" and take jobs where they are counted on to make complex decisions as masters of advanced technology. (b) Second, that there just will not be enough high-skilled work, under any conceivable scenario, for billions of people to perform. There will not be that much to occupy the citizenry even in one of the advanced economies, much less in the less developed countries.

Polarization, Not Unemployment, is the Likely Result in the More *Laissez-faire* Economies

In the advanced economies, the engine of science, high technology and global competition will cause the market economy to so greatly enrich a portion of the population that their wealth may well provide the needed demand for services from the others. Riches will go to leading-edge entrepreneurs, that fraction of the population that is employed in operating existing or in creating new technology, people who provide something marketable that mass markets can disseminate to tens of millions or even billions of others, and investors who own part of the productive mechanism. If there are enough of these, they will provide demand for a multitude of subsidiary services to be performed by others.

The wages for the millions who will provide ancillary services will be pressed down, to be sure, by the limitations of demand, the introduction of non-labor intensive ways of providing them, and the enormous supply of people anxious to offer them. In theory, those wages could fall to the subsistence level, but in fact they will not unless the cultural factors that have repealed Malthus's dire predictions are also repealed, such as by mass immigration. In fact, the "rising tide" of potential well-being caused by science and technology may even lift everyone to a level that in absolute terms is higher than the present one. But the wages will be very low relative to the riches of the groups of people who are able effectually to draw income from the productive mechanism.

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Although we are still just in the incipient stages, and the process has much further to go, this polarization of income and of wealth is precisely what the United States has been experiencing. The Federal Reserve Bank symposium at Jackson Hole in August 1998 had income inequality as its subject. Alan Greenspan, the Federal Reserve's chairman, observed that "in recent years... several countries have experienced a widening in earnings and income inequality... There has been general agreement that technological change has been a key contributing factor...." One speaker, according to the summary, "noted that the rising wage inequality in the United States is a pervasive phenomenon, running throughout income and educational groups." Another speaker indicated that "high-income individuals have experienced relatively larger gains in income than low-income individuals in recent years...."[84] These observations are borne out by the ever-widening difference, say, between executive compensation and the compensation of the average employee of an American firm; in mid-1999, an AFL-CIO study reported that "the average CEO of a major corporation in 1997 made $7.8 million, or 326 times more than the $24,000 earned by a typical American factory worker." By comparison, the multiple in Germany is 25 times the average worker's wage.[85]

Implications for Supporters of a Market Economy

There is some possibility that the supporters of a market economy will extrapolate their market ideology (which has in the past welcomed, as a hallmark of freedom and incentive, the inequalities of the old economy) to provide a normative rationale for the developing polarization. But such a rationale will not be true to the values of classical liberalism, when those values are understood as a whole. To classical liberalism the market economy is not just an essential alternative to a command economy, but is a way to realize the benefits of the vital energies of millions of people pursuing their own ends. The aspiration has been for a vast middle class, with the entire population producing and benefitting. Classical liberals have believed in an aristocracy of merit, not culturally (or technologically) hardened

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[84] *Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Economic Review*, Fourth Quarter 1998, Vol. 83, No. 4, pp. 1, 5, 8.

[85] *Wichita Eagle*, Associate Press report by Maggie Jackson, May or June 1999.

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aristocracy. They saw the Old Regime of medievalist Europe as antithetical to their "republican" aspirations, not as an expression of them.

Classical liberals need to examine fresh the fundamental conceptual basis for earnings and property, revisiting John Locke to raise again the questions of legitimacy and entitlement. The Lockean concept has been that "somebody mixes his labor with something and thereby becomes the owner of it," creating property; and that all earnings and wealth are then derived from freely-contracted-for transactions dealing with that property or the property each person has in his own services. The classical liberal economist Frederic Bastiat centered his classic little book *The Law* on the premise that any deviation from this property-and-contract nexus is theft. This has long provided a compelling rationale against socialist attacks on the market. The question will be to what extent it continues to do so under conditions that defeat much of what classical liberalism has long sought.

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THE DISPOSSESSION OF THE AMERICAN INDIAN – AND OTHER KEY ISSUES IN AMERICAN HISTORY

Dwight D. Murphey, Ph. D., J.D.

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BOOK REVIEW ARTICLE

Money: A Review

Edward M. Miller[1]
University of New Orleans

Money: Who Has How Much and Why
Andrew Hacker
Touchstone, 1997

Andrew Hacker provides a pleasant, readable answer to the question of who has how much and why for the United States. While the source for the data is primarily U.S. government documents and other standard sources, there is only a brief list of sources and no detailed footnotes. However, the basic statistics seem to be correct. It is in these figures that much of the fascination of the book lies. The book provides a delightful supply of information about who makes what, and who has what.

The book provides very little information about incomes outside of the United States. However, what is does provide is important. In 1995 the U.S. gross domestic product per capita was sixth in the world (with the leaders in order being Switzerland, Japan, Norway, Denmark, and Germany). In 1970 the U.S. was comfortably ahead of all other countries. However, when measured in terms of purchasing power, the U.S. still leads the world, although by a smaller margin. While Hacker attributes the difference to one of prices (U.S. prices are lower relative to wages), on a more fundamental basis the difference is that the U.S. is consuming a higher proportion of its output (and investing less) than most other industrialized countries.

Hacker makes the point that the average income of the families in which children are being raised is much lower than the average income for adults, because the lower income individuals have more children. A third of all children are being raised in families where the average income is below $25,000. Of course, he fails to mention what this implies for the future, given how much family income is affected

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by genetics (see Pearson 1997, Lynn, 1996 for evidence on this, or the summary in Miller 1997).

One of the messages of the book is that U.S. incomes are frequently distributed in highly arbitrary ways. One table shows the starting salaries for lawyers. Associates' earnings ranges from 2.1 to 2.4 times the average earnings in the city, but the rate for partners ranges from 11.5 times in Milwaukee on up to 39.9 as much in New York. Thus, profits per partner in New York's wealthiest firm are $1,595,000, while they are only $310,000 in Milwaukee. Another table shows the average full professor's earnings in different states, ranging from $47,900 for the main state campuses in North Dakota to $90,800 in New Jersey.

One of the themes of the book is that income is unevenly distributed, and the distribution is becoming even less even. In the first few pages we learn that the top 20% of U.S. households (those with over $115,514 in 1996 income) earn 49.0% of the total income. It is documented that income inequality has become more unequal, with the lowest fifth (below $8,596) having actually had their income (in 1996 dollars) decline slightly since 1976, while the other quintiles saw an increase. Interesting, the median income for men declined from $24,898 to $23,834 during the same period. This small decline in the median is consistent with the average male income having gone up, because the higher income males saw their incomes rise by more than lower income males saw their's decline.

A fascinating chapter discusses the 68,064 income tax forms (1994) that reported over a million dollars in income – not mere "millionaires" ($1,000,000 in wealth) – filed by those whose yearly incomes exceeded one million dollars. In 1979 there were only 13,505 (about a fifth as many) returns with equivalent incomes (based on the author' calculation that $500,000 was the 1979 equivalent of a million current dollars). Among the fascinating trivia is that charitable donations from this group averaged only 4% of income, and that only 13% of this group reported no income from work (i.e. the "idle rich"). Hacker fairly notes that many of these may have been too old to work, pointing out that 15% were over 70 and collecting social security. Mortgage interest paid by this group averaged $32,814. Interestingly, 251 of those reporting million dollar incomes also report unemployment compensation, averaging $3,275!

A chapter on chief executives' incomes (with interesting tables

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and figures) raises the question of whether such high incomes are really necessary to attract talent, noting that most chief executives come up from the ranks and would have trouble finding other jobs at the same pay level. An explanation offered is that the compensation is set by boards of directors, themselves well-paid and beholden to the chief executives, something that the ordinary shareholder can do little about.

Unfortunately, the book does suffer from a political correctness inability to admit that there are racial or ethnic differences in ability. In spite of all the publicity given to *The Bell Curve*, Hacker does not feel it to be necessary to even consider the possibility that races and ethnic groups might differ for reasons other than discrimination. This is seen in the first sentence of the chapter titled "Outcasts and Immigrants" where we read that "If the United States were truly a color-blind society, then black and white Americans would show much the same distribution across the income spectrum." This statement would only be true if there were no ability or motivational differences, even if these arose from previous environmental causes. Incidentally, Brazil is reported to be much closer to a color-blind society than the U.S., but it still shows similar patterns of income differences. Needless to say, as one would expect from a book written by the author of *The Promised Land* (which dealt with the migration of U.S. blacks to the northern states), there is no discussion of the evidence presented in *The Bell Curve* (Herrnstein & Murray, 1994) that once one controls for intelligence, there are only small differences between black and white earnings. And of course, there is no mention of the evidence (Jensen 1998, Levin 1997, or the summary in Miller, 1998) that racial differences in intelligence are primarily due to genetic factors.

We also encounter the mysterious (and false statement) "A family just off the plane from Korea has more choice as to where they may live – and where they may send their children to school – than has a black couple whose people have been here for four centuries"(p. 235). Of course, both have a legal and practical right to live where they can afford to (and blacks meet the residence requirements for public housing, while the fresh-off-the-plane immigrant does not). This is followed by a long discussion which blames poverty for the problems which the poor suffer disproportionately from, poor educational outcomes, high crime rates, poor health (including high

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AIDS rates) and asserts these problems would be solved if the problem of poverty were solved. Alas, the evidence from behavior genetics is that low intelligence (and its outcome in large numbers in special education), crime, poor health, are to a large part due to the genetic traits that the poor happen to have (and which often cause them to be poor) rather than poverty itself.

One chapter uses the fictional device of four imaginary sisters to contrast the lives of a housewife, a welfare mother, a single working mother, and a well paid, childless professional woman. Even here, abundant statistics make clear how typical these different types are, retaining the basic documentary nature of the book. This is naturally followed by a chapter on the gender gap. There are the usual statistics on how women earn less than men. However, it turns out that a 1993 Census study found that never-married women working at full-time jobs earned $1005 for every thousand dollars earned by comparable men.

Notwithstanding these observations, overall the book provides a very readable introduction to income distribution.

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Book Reviews

Stranger in the Nest: Do Parents Really Shape their Child's Personality, Intelligence, or Character
David B. Cohen
John Wiley and Sons, 1999

Where do children's (and adults) personality, intelligence and character come from? Many questions of social policy, such as the origins and cures for poverty, depend on this question. Other questions of anthropologists care about, such as how much can differences in cultural rearing patterns affect children's behavior (and hence their behavior when they become adults) depend on this. Thus, this is more than a book about parenting.

How often do parents, having tried to raise the perfect child, one that reflect their values and goals, find that they have a "Stranger in the Nest", a child that turns out not to be one that reflects their values (including those of their culture) and desires? This happen often, and explain the title of the new book by University of Texas psychologist, David B. Cohen. The basic message of the book is given by the sub-title "Do Parents Really Shape their Child's Personality, Intelligence, or Character", with the answer a resounding no. Instead the book emphasizes the role of genetic and pre-natal events in shaping intelligence and personality.

The book puts the emphasis on the good news for parents whose children have turned out other than as they would wish. It points out how diseases such as schizophrenia, manic-depression, and autism were once blamed on poor parenting, but now they are regarded as due to biological causes that parents can not be blamed for. The evidence for these conclusions comes from family studies, especially those of twins and adopted children.

In the other direction, the numerous cases where well-intentioned and good parents produce criminal offspring are described. If outstanding individuals produce poor offspring, and poor parents often produce excellent offspring, differences in parenting within the normal range are unlikely to have major effects on basic personality.

Cohen also points to the common observation that siblings, even

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same sex siblings, are radically different, both in personality and intelligence (sibling IQ differences average 12 points, which is 70% of the 18 point difference among children randomly selected from the same population). This is hard to explain by traditional social rearing theories, since parents usually raise their children in the same way. Yet it is easily explained by a genetic theory (perhaps supplemented by there being a random component in development, such as Miller 1997 has proposed).

Some of best-documented genetic effects are for intelligence. Behavior genetics makes it possible to partition the environmental influence into that due to being reared in the same family (referred to as shared variance) and that due to other causes. One of the most striking findings is that the familial influences are so weak. Identical twins raised apart correlate about .75, while those reared together correlate .85. This suggests the effect of being reared together given identical genes is only .1, really quite small. As small as this is, studies of the IQ resemblance of unrelated children adopted into the same household show that they have essentially zero IQ resemblance. This suggests that the effect of being reared in the same family is essentially zero. Most of the environmental effects documented (and behavior genetic methods do prove that there are environmental effects) appear to be due to things that siblings within the same family do not share. (Rowe 1994 presents much evidence for this).

Supporting evidence for the role of genes is provided by many findings. Brain size correlates with IQ, ability tests done at 6 months (before most environmental influences have had a chance to exercise their effects) correlate with childhood IQ, adult IQ correlates with the biological relatives of adoptees, but not with that of the adoptive parents, and IQ correlates with reaction times. For more on these correlations see Miller's (1999) review and summary of Jensen's (1998) recent book in this journal, or the review and summary (Miller 1996) of Brand's book (Brand, 1996) also call *The g Factor*. Interestingly, the publisher of Cohen's book is the same Wiley that withdrew Brand's book from the book stores, apparently because it discussed scientific facts about racial differences in intelligence they did not want discussed.

Cohen points to the experience of homosexuals as evidence of the power of biology, since most homosexuals adopt their sexual orientation and behavior in spite of strong social pressures not to be

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homosexual. This is one case where a naturally born child may feel like a stranger in the nest. He describes the evidence that there is a genetic influence on homosexuality, which comes from both twin studies and from research dealing with a specific location on the X chromosome. Twin studies suggest a heritability of between 25% and 75%. Specific markers on a region of the X chromosome known as X28 were shared in 33 out of 40 homosexual pairs of brothers, far above the expected 50% sharing if there was no genetic effect.

While this is basically a book for the layman (and especially for parents), the professional will learn things he had not been aware of. Recently, University of Texas psychologists Jeremy Beer and Joe Horn used an adoption study to look for evidence of the social effects of birth order. They compared first-born adoptive children reared either as a social senior with a younger sibling, or as a social junior with an older sibling. None of the IQ and personality effects for birth order that had been reported in other studies showed up.

This points to a prenatal effect rather than a rearing effect. Blanchard and Klassen (1997) have proposed a biological theory that could explain the birth order effect on homosexuality. Miller (forthcoming) has extended this theory to explain other birth order effects, as well as to reconcile evidence for the heritability of homosexuality with the evolutionary argument that genes for homosexuality should be strongly selected against.

Awareness of the positive evidence for genetic and prenatal effects makes obvious the faults in the many studies presented as showing the importance of environmental effects in general, and parenting in particular. The first major section of the book is devoted to critiquing the various studies that have claimed to demonstrate the importance of environmental effects, and the importance of parenting.

The most common example of overstating environmental effects is to simply ignore the possibility (or probability) that the observations are due to genetic effects. For instance a young child may readily exhibit anger, just as his parents do. Instead of saying that the child inherited a quick temper, it may be asserted that he never learned from his parents to control his temper.

Mistakes of this type are frequently made with regard to intelligence, and traits associated with intelligence such as academic and economic achievement. Intelligence is know to be strongly correlated

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with academic and economic achievement (see Herrnstein & Murray 1994 or Miller's 1995 review and summary of their book in this journal). As shown above there is substantial heritability for intelligence. Yet, when intelligent parents are observed to have intelligent children, the obvious explanation (to those familiar with the behavior genetic evidence) is rejected, namely that the children inherited the parents' intelligence. His problem solving skills are instead attributed to how his parents reared him. The same is often done for academic achievement, which in children is often attributed to the parents good rearing and the good environment provided, rather than to smart parents having smart children who do well in school.

By such arguments Cohen builds up to his conclusions that while environmental influences and parenting are important, their impact is limited. Parents should not blame themselves when their offspring indeed turn out to be "strangers in the nest."

Edward M. Miller
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Peril in Panama
Richard A. Delguadio
National Security Center
Washington D.C., Dec. 1998

At noon, December 31, 1999, the United States completes its withdrawal from the Panama Canal zone. This book is dedicated to revealing what it, and many members of the U.S. Congress, regard as a threat to U.S. national security. Harbors at both the east and west ends of the Panama Canal and a former U.S. military base will henceforth be managed by managed by a Chinese Hong Kong based company, the Hutchison Whampao – which many regard as a front organization for the Beijing government. The contract for the management of these utilities is alleged by critics to have been obtained by bribery. China is portrayed as a major threat to world peace, and to American interests in the Pacific – the Panama Canal, of course, being the only practical route for American mercantile and naval shipping to transit between the Atlantic and the Pacific Oceans.

Much attention is given to exposing the links between the Hutchison Whampao company and Beijing, so that the reader is inclined to accept this at face value, as members of the U.S. senate have done. The author then goes on to stress the growing military capability of Beijing, which already dominates much of the Far East:

> Red China has emerged as the premier strategic and military threat to U.S. security in the world. It has the largest population (more than four times the population of the U.S.) in the world. This massive population allows Red China to put 3 million men on active duty and 12 million more in the reserves - the world's largest military force. The army has 2,290,000 men under anus. The navy has 240,000 members, including about 25,000 in the naval air force, and another 6,000 in the marines. These naval personnel operate as many as 1700 vessels, including China's more than 90 submarines, some of them armed with nuclear missiles. The air force has 470,000 members, including 220,000 in air defense. They fly an estimated 5000 combat aircraft. Red China has 18 intercontinental nuclear missiles [soon to be 24], 13 of which were pointed at American cities, and over 100 intermediate and medium range nuclear missiles. At this writing, what the American media call the threat to the "modernization" of Red China's nuclear missile forces, has just added another six long

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range nuclear missiles to this force. Reports abound about the latest U.S. technology being made available to Red China, to enable those missiles to strike at American targets more accurately than ever before. An even more modern factory complex is being finalized at this writing, to enable a faster and larger "modernization" program in the future.

We have all read the more recent allegations of Chinese theft of American nuclear and missile technology, and of financial gifts to the U.S. Democratic Party, with the alleged foreknowledge and complicity of President Clinton and Vice President Gore themselves, which are believed to have emanated from Beijing. These are not a subject of the book under review, since such allegations have surfaced in the press only subsequent to the appearance of the book, but they add pungency to the author's description of China as an enemy of America. Convinced that the Peoples' Republic of China is a long-term threat to the U.S.A., Delguadio reminds readers that the U.S. suffered as many as 150,000 casualties in the Korean war, when it controlled the Pacific and did not face an enemy armed with missiles and nuclear weapons.

Although many would still challenge the author's claim that China could become a military threat to the United States in the not too distant future, few would be inclined today to overlook the reality of China's threat to Taiwan. It is a fact that if China had the ability to block the Panama Canal, American pre-eminence in the Pacific would be seriously hampered in the event it sought to intervene in a China-Taiwan confrontation. The author's argument that China might eventually seek to place medium range missiles in the Panama zone (it has some 150 available) where they would be capable of hitting American cities is perhaps not urgently convincing. But remembering that the Soviet Union actually placed nuclear missiles in Cuba, and the seriousness of the situation that resulted from that move, one must at least take note of Delguadio's observations here.

This small book will certainly open the reader's eyes to a significance development which to date has been but little mentioned in the daily press. It is consequently timely and should be given much more attention than it has so far won.

C. T. Timothy

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The Prison Called Hohenasperg
by Arthur D. Jacobs
Universal Publishers, 1999

The significance of this book varies with the level of comprehension with which it is read. It is possible to read it simply as the personal memoir of a retired American Air Force major who tells the gripping account of his experiences during and immediately after World War II, when as the son of German parents living in Brooklyn, he was held in internment first at Ellis Island, then at Crystal City, Texas, before finally, at age 12, being deported to just-defeated Germany, where he was transported with others in a locked and unheated boxcar and finally imprisoned, as if a Nazi, in the American military prison at Hohenasperg, Germany. The narrative continues to tell how he celebrated his thirteenth birthday in his cell there, but was transferred to a camp in Ludwigsberg. After he, his brother, and parents were released in March 1946, they lived a life of destitution and near-starvation in Germany until finally an American woman made arrangements for him to return to the United States to live with a family in western Kansas. He did not see his parents again until 1958.

The broader meaning of the book is found in part in what it tells us about Americans of that time. Some were warm-hearted and generous, such as at the internment camp in Crystal City, where everything was done to make the conditions humane, and such as the woman who in effect rescued him and directed him to the family that made him one of their own in Kansas. While he was in Germany seeking ways to help his family survive, Jacobs was befriended by American G.I.s. Other Americans, however, were cold, bureaucratic, often extremely cruel, in ways that readers will be shocked to discover: the FBI's ransacking the Jacobs family's home in Brooklyn repeatedly, and taking away the father, without any explanation; the inhumanity of 92 hours in a frozen boxcar without heat or blankets, with only a common bucket for urination and defecation, and with only bread and water to eat and drink; the incarceration of a young boy in a heavily guarded cell, where he was told that the punishment for misbehavior would be hanging. This is a portrait that Americans don't like to associate with themselves. If it came from someone anti-American, it would be one thing; but it comes from a man who,

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as a native-born American citizen, went on to serve his country until his retirement from the Air Force.

What is perhaps most significant about the memoir, however, is that in very human terms it "gives the lie" to the claims of alienated Japanese-American activists, and the many others who have pandered to them politically and ideologically, since the 1960s that the United States evinced a vicious anti-Oriental racism during World War II by interning Japanese-Americans, but not doing so with German-Americans. It shows that Germans in the United States were in fact interned and deported – and, with them, their children who, having been born in the United States, were American citizens. This undercuts the cry of "unique victimization" made by the activists.

We know, of course, that much else undercuts their claims. While Japanese aliens were in fact interned, and Japanese-Americans who proclaimed a fierce loyalty to Japan were also held in compulsory custody at Tule Lake, the great bulk of Japanese-Americans were not interned at all, but were evacuated from the west coast of the United States to relocation camps, from which they could then resettle for the duration of the war, if they wished, to any part of the country other than the west coast. Funds were even raised to help send 4,300 young Japanese-Americans to 300 American colleges while the war was still in progress. Conditions at the relocation camps were along the lines of those described by Jacobs at Crystal City: somewhat spartan housing identical to the barracks in which American soldiers were housed, but with a great many cultural and recreational amenities.

The book is enhanced by an insightful Introduction by Joseph E. Fallon, who adds a point we might otherwise not have thought of: that "one of the primary purposes of the internment program was to provide the U.S. Government with leverage in negotiations with Berlin for the return of persons from the Americas who were interned by [the] Third Reich." Thus, Jacobs found by painful experience that in wartime the fate of individuals often turns on larger strategic or tactical needs.

Dwight D. Murphey

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Essays in Eugenics

SIR FRANCIS GALTON, F.R.S.

With Biographical Introduction

by

ROGER PEARSON, PH.D.

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Crime as Destiny
A Study of Criminal Twins

Professor Dr. J. Lange

Departmental Director, Kaiser Wilhelm Institute

Translated by Charlotte Haldane

Foreword by J. B. S. Haldane

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This is a reprint of the original 1931 translation by Charlotte Haldane of the pioneer 1928 study conducted by J. Lange of the criminal records of a number of monozygotic and dizygotic twins. It is a work of outstanding interest to all who students of criminology, heredity or twin studies.

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